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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Purpose
The purpose of this study was to analyze and model 
beer consumption trends in the state of Montana on both a 
seasonal and an annual basis. The most appropriate models 
have been used in generating forecasts of future beer demand 
in Montana. Forces endogenous and exogenous to the brewing 
industry have been used in tempering these forecasts; that 
is, the quantitative forecasts were moderated by qualitative 
or judgemental factors based on the analysis of the industry 
presented in Chapter II.
Background 
The Early Years 
/^Some form of a beer-like alcoholic beverage has 
been a part of human culture for at least six thousand 
years.^ In ages past there were as many different types 
of beers as there were venturesome brewers. Each beer was
■^Edward H. Vogel et al., The Practical Brewer: A 
Manual for the Brewing Industry (St. Louis: Von Hoffman 
Press, 1946), p. 187.
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a reflection of the imagination and skill of its brewer, 
and all were different.
The nature of the brewing process has undergone 
extensive transformations. Beer was originally brewed by 
an individual for his own personal consumption by employ­
ing a very simple process. Agricultural products left 
over from the previous harvest were allowed to ferment with 
a judicious amount of heat and water. Today, the brewing 
process is highly automated and quality controlled, to the
extent that most beers are similar in appearance and
2 .taste. There is also evidence that a higher price con-
3notes higher quality.
The work done by a Frenchman, Louis Pasteur, 
approximately ninety-three years ago foreshadowed the 
change in the nature of the brewing process. His dis­
covery of the pasteurization process had far-reaching 
effects on the brewing of beer.
When beer is pasteurized, it does not have to be 
kept cool in order to retard spoilage. Before the wide­
spread pasteurization of beer, all brewers produced beer
2 .William F. Glueck, Business Policy: Strategy 
Formation and Management Action, 2nd ed. (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1976), p. 570.
3See Steward H. Rewoldt, James D. Scott, and Martin 
R . Warshaw, Introduction to Marketing Management: Text and 
Cases, revised ed. (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, 
Inc., 1973), pp. 177-90; Glueck, Business Policy, p. 570; 
and "An Experimental Examination of the Price-Quality 
Relationship," Journal of Business, October 1968, p. 442.
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only for the local market (or only for their personal con­
sumption) because it quickly spoiled when transported to 
other markets. Also, the production of beer was highly 
seasonal because of the requirement for tremendous amounts 
of ice for cooling in order to retard spoilage. For 
example, the typical brewer who produced beer for the 
public, brewed as much beer as possible during the spring 
and kept it cool with ice gathered throughout the winter.
If all worked according to plan, the beer and ice would run 
out at the same time, usually by the middle of the summer, 
with little or no spoilage.
Furthermore, the costs associated with the trans­
portation of nonpasteurized beer were probable high enough 
to prohibit enterprising brewers from attempting to serve 
other than the local markets. Costs would have increased 
so steeply (due to higher handling costs, ice for cooling, 
and high transportation costs for labor and special equip­
ment) that they 'would not have been able to compete with 
local brewers endogenous to the new market area. In 
addition, the residents of the new market areas may not 
have been receptive to an outsider who was trying to take 
business away from their friend, the local brewer.
However, Louis Pasteur's discovery of the pasteur­
ization process enabled brewers to expand into other than 
local markets on a level more competitive with their en­
dogenous rivals. This stimulated considerable change in
4
the production and marketing of beer.
Beer in America
Beer and the brewing industry have existed in this
country since its founding; beer and brewing expertise
accompanied the first settlers from Europe. The first
brewery in this country was established on Manhattan
4Island m  the early 1600s. it is not an exaggeration to 
say that beer and distilled spirits helped tame the wild 
frontier.
However, attitudes toward alcoholic beverages 
changed, and by the start of the twentieth century, con­
siderable opposition to production and sale of such 
beverages had developed. On October 28, 1919, Congress 
passed the Volstead Act which opposed the sale of alcoholic 
beverages. Then on January 16, 1920, the eighteenth am- 
mendent was ratified, initiating the era of prohibition. 
Thirteen years later, on March 22, 1933, President
Roosevelt signed the Cullen-Harrison Bill, once again
. . . 5legalizing the sale of alcoholic beverages. The
twenty-first ammendment, which repealed the eighteenth 
ammendment, was eventually ratified by all the states 
ending the era of prohibition or the era of legislated
4The Brewing Industry in the United States:
Brewer1s Almanac (Washington, D.C.: United States Brewer's 
Association, Inc., 1975), pp. 76-77.
5Vogel, Practical Brewer, pp. 190-1.
abstinence.
The period of prohibition has been researched in
detail and has been the subject of many publications. A
discussion of prohibition is beyond the scope of this
paper, however, there is one point worth mentioning. It
took the nation and the brewing industry forty-two years
to recover from the effects of prohibition. That is, per
capita consumption was at a peak of 21.0 gallons in 1914
and it did not reach that level again until 1975, when it
7reached 21.4 gallons.
Overview
Chapter II focuses on the economics of the 
brewing industry as a whole. The movement toward concen­
tration (oligopoly), on a national level, is analyzed. 
Also, the Lorenz Curve and the Herfindahl Index are em­
ployed to illustrate changes in market share by the 
brewers. Chapter II provides the basis for qualitative 
imputs to forecasts of future beer consumption in Chapter
V.
In Chapter III the general characteristics of the 
supply and demand of beer in Montana are outlined. The 
history of the price of a popular brand of beer is traced
^See for example Andrew Sinclair, Prohibition; The 
Era of Excess (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1952).
7Brewer*s Almanac, 1976, p. 13.
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under the assumption that this particular brand is re­
presentative of general beer price movements• Legal 
barriers prohibiting the entry of new beer/liquor estab­
lishments into the market are investigated— affecting the 
supply side. This section is also used in qualitatively 
tempering the forecasts in Chapter V.
The next section, Chapter IV, contains the quanti­
tative analysis. Two approaches were used, a seasonal 
analysis and then a yearly analysis of statewide beer 
consumption trends with quantitative forecasts (that is, 
the forecasts were not balanced or tempered with the quali­
tative inputs from Chapters II and III) . The main analy­
tical tool involved use of the techniques of multiple 
regression. In choosing the models of best fit, the standard 
statistical tests associated with regression analysis were 
employed.
In the final section, Chapter V, the quantitative 
forecasts from Chapter IV were moderated by the qualitative 
(or judgemental) factors facing the brewing industry pre­
sented in Chapters II and III. In other words, the forecasts 
represent a synthesis of the trend toward concentration 
in the industry with the models arrived at through a statis­
tical analysis of past beer consumption in Montana.
CHAPTER II
THE EVOLUTION AND STRUCTURE OF THE BREWING INDUSTRY
Technological and Sociological Forces 
Since about 1940, the nature of the manufacturing 
sector in the United States has undergone extensive 
changes, both technological and sociological. Technolog­
ical changes have been manifested in the form of new 
methods and materials of production, levels of automation, 
and shilled versus unshilled manpower requirements. Some­
what in opposition to technological changes are the socio­
logical changes such as management/labor relations 
(including compensation and worhing conditions), govern­
ment regulation of business, and environmental concerns—  
air, water and noise pollution.
The brewing industry has not been an exception; it 
has been significantly affected by these changes in the 
economy in step with the rest of the manufacturing sector. 
Technological and sociological forces have influenced the 
brewing industry in two ways: internal (or intraindustry) 
and external (or interindustry). Internally, brewers are 
struggling to reduce production cost3 per barrel through
7
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plant expansion and automation.^ Because the brewing 
industry is characterized by intense rivalry among firms, 
the reduction of production costs per barrel w.i th increased 
firm size (economies of scale in production) is critical to 
ensuring the long-run survival and growth of each individ­
ual brewing company. The problem is that the si^mll or 
local brewers lack the capital required for large increases 
in plant capacity, putting them at a competitive disadvan­
tage in relation to the large brewers.
Externally, there are three main forces impinging 
the industry. First, there are legal battles between the 
sa|mll and large brewers. Pearl Brewing Company has a law­
suit pending against Anheuser-Busch and Schlitz, charging 
that predatory pricing by these two large brewers is the 
primary cause of their significant loss of market share
2m  Texas (6 percent m  1976 versus 23 percent in 1966).
The federal government has also taken an interest in the 
marketing practices of the big brewers, in that the Justice 
Department, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and 
the Treasury Department are in the process of conducting 
investigations to determine if charges (by the regional
^The barrel is the standard unit of measure in the 
brewing industry. Each barrel contains thirty-one gallons 
of beer.
2"Turmoil Among the Brewers: Miller's Fast Growth 
Upsets the Beer Industry," Business Week, 8 November 1976, 
p . 67 .
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brewers) of payoffs and kickbacks to large retail customers
(to get more and better shelf space for their products) are 
3true. The extent of bureaucratic corruption at the Joseph
Schlitz Brewing Company has been so severe that the four
top executives in the marketing department have been sus-=
4pended, due to intense government investigations. In 
response to the governmental allegations of questionable 
marketing practices at Schlitz, the chairman of the Adolph 
Coors Company, William K. Coors said, "You can't be in 
the brewing industry and not know that this type of thing
5has been going on for years." Other examples are plenti­
ful, leading one to believe that the brewing industry is 
rather corrupt.
The second force involves environmental questions 
concerning nonreturnable containers and pull-tab metal 
containers. Although municipal solid waste is composed of 
only 6 percent metal and glass containers from beer and 
soft drinks, the controversy over them is heated. Five 
states, Michigan, Maine, Vermont, South Dakota and Oregon, 
have enacted restrictive container legislation. Between
^Ibid.
4"Another Setback for Troubled Schlitz," Business 
Week, 6 September 1976, p. 20.
5Ibid.
^"Containers, Basic Analysis," Standard & Poor's 
Industry Surveys. 17 June 1976, p. C117.
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them, the lavs are quite varied; but, in general, non- 
returnable containers require a substantial deposit, 
some have banned nonreturnable containers entirely, and
7some have banned metal containers with removable pull-tabs.
It has not been reliably determined if the benefits 
would exceed the costs of an industry-wide switch to 
returnable containers. However, if the conversion is 
required and a 90 percent return rate is realized for all 
containers, container manufacturers will experience a col­
lective cost increase of $2 billion to $3 billion for 
facilities conversion. This is likely to result in higher 
prices to consumers at a time when both the brewing and 
container industries have been making substantial price 
increases.
Finally, a shift in the population profile is 
changing the main beer drinking segment, the 18 to 34 
age group. This segment is expected to begin decreasing
oin size in the 1980s after several years of fast growth.
This segment accounts for more than half of all beer 
gconsumed•
7See "Beverages, Basic Analysis," Standard & Poor's 
Industry Surveys, 28 October 1976, p. B72; "Beverages,
Current Analysis,” Standard & Poor*s Industry Surveys,
2 December 1976, p. B53; and "Containers, Current Analysis," 
Standard & Poor’s Industry Surveys, 16 December 1976, p. C97.g"Turmoil Among the Brewers," p. 59i 
9Ibid., p. 67.
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Because of these technological and sociological 
forces, internal and external to the industry, the brewing 
industry is becoming more concentrated, or more strongly 
oligopolistic.
The next section of this chapter describes the 
changes in the structure of the brewing industry since the 
end of prohibition. The remainder of this chapter also 
provides the basis for the qualitative inputs that were 
used in tempering the quantitative forecasts of beer 
consumption in Montana in Chapter V.
The Rise of the National Market
In 1934, one year after the end of prohibition, 
there were approximately 756 breweries in operation in the 
United States.1^ It is likely that they were all separate 
brewing companies because the industry was in its.infancy 
in 1934 and it is highly unlikely that there were many, if 
any, multiplant companies in existence. In contrast, there 
were ninety-eight breweries composed of forty-nine separate 
brewing companies in 1976.^ Table 1 illustrates the
 ̂̂ Walter Adams, ed., The Structure of American 
Industry, 4th ed, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co.,
Inc., 1971), p. 194.
11See "Turmoil Among the Brewers," p. 59; and 
"Geographical Listings," The Brewers* Digest: Buyers*
Guide and Directory, section two, January 1976, pp. 18-36.
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changes in the number of breweries as opposed to brewing 
companies in operation for selected years since prohibi­
tion.
TABLE 1
BREWERIES AND COMPANIES IN OPERATION FOR SELECTED 
YEARS SINCE PROHIBITION
Year Breweries Companies Year Breweries Companies
1933 31 31* 1958 258 211
1934 756 756* 1963 211 150
1935 750 750* 1967 176 93
1940 611 n.a. 1970 154 n.a.
1947 440 404 1974 118 n.a.
1950 407 n.a. 1975 117 50
1954 301 263 1976 98 49
SOURCES: Brewer's Almanac, 1976, pp. 14 and 26; 
"Turmoil Among the Brewers," p. 59; The Brewers' Digest, 
1976, pp. 18-36; Adams, American Industry, pp. 192-4; 
and "Beverages, Basic Analysis," p. B63.
*The number of companies was not available for 
1933 to 1935; however, it may be assumed that all 
breweries were separate companies. During these years, 
the brewing industry was so’young that the existence of 
multiplant companies is doubtful.
**Throughout this study, the abbreviation, n.a., 
will be used to indicate that data is not available.
Although concrete evidence is not available, it 
is reasonable to assume that most, if not all, brewers at 
the end of prohibition served local or regional markets 
only. However, three major events came into play, more 
or less simultaneously, enabling brewers to become 
national in their distribution. The ordering of these 
factors has no bearing on their relative importance.
13
First, changes in the nature of the transportation 
industry provided an impetus for changes in the brewing in­
dustry. The tractor-trailer, as opposed to railcar, offer­
ing faster and much more flexible delivery of goods, 
emerged as the primary mode of transportation for many 
manufactured goods. With the truck, the geographic limits 
of the market served by each brewer could be extended with­
out building new plants.
Second, the tremendous growth in the mass media
since World War II, especially television, stimulated
changes in the brewing industry by providing a medium for
highly controlled and coordinated national advertising
campaingns for the promotion of brand names and images,
12with the subsequent attainment of brand loyalty.
Third, the post World War II American society 
was more innovative and affluent than in previous years. This 
resulted in intraindustry and interindustry technological 
advances, as well as a greatly increased demand for leisure 
activities and products which would not be classified as 
necessities. These events, plus a probable array of others 
that are less important, have interacted in determining the 
changes that the brewing industry has experienced since 
prohibition..
12 . . .Douglas F. Greer, "Product Differentiation and
Concentration in the Brewing Industry," Journal of 
Industrial Economics, July 1971, p. 213.
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Once the stage had been set by the forces shaping 
the society in the post World War II environment, far­
sighted brewers went national by building or purchasing 
breweries in various parts of the country. This resulted 
in brand recognition on a national level, rather Lhan on a 
local or regional level within the cost-effective radius 
of a truck-hauling operation from the home brewery/distri­
butor. Taken in perspective, these factors interacted to 
produce an accelerated "carousel effect", where a slight 
initial interaction sets the stage for increased interac­
tion, and so on. That is, the mass media (television) 
made the promotion of brand names relatively inexpensive 
when considering the subsequent high level of consumer 
brand recognition and loyalty, which made entry into the 
national market easier, which created the need for regional 
distributors dispersed nationally with their fleets of 
delivery trucks, which created the need for increased 
advertising, etc. This is referred to as a "carousel 
effect” because an analyst can go through the above stim- 
ulus-response iteration by starting at any point.
The Trend Toward Concentration 
As the brewing industry became oriented to the 
national market rather than to the local or regional mar­
ket, a trend was started that is still affecting the in­
dustry today—  the trend toward concentration. The brewing
15
industry is becoming more concentrated or more oligopolis­
tic. At the end of prohibition the brewing industry was 
characterized by a large number of firms of approximately 
equal size. Now the industry is represented by relatively 
few very large firms and a fringe of smaller local or 
regional firms.
The gross number of breweries versus companies was 
shown in Table 1. Table 2 demonstrates the changes in 
market share of the top five and top ten brewing companies 
for selected years since prohibition. From the data in 
Table 2 (especially when analyzed in conjunction with 
Table 1) it is seen that the large brewing companies are 
becoming increasingly dominant in the marketplace at the 
expense of the smaller companies. In 1940 the five largest 
companies accounted for 16.3 percent of the beer market; 
their share had increased to 69.0 percent in 1976.
A Measure of Concentration
A Lorenz Curve can be used to demonstrate the 
degree of inequality of firm sizes in the brewing industry. 
Figure 1 illustrates a Lorenz Curve, which provides a 
measure of relative concentration among all of the firms 
composing the market (industry). The diagonal (line AC) 
is the line of absolute equality; that is, if all the 
companies in the industry possess equal market shares, then 
the Lorenz Curve is the diagonal. The smallest ten percent
16
TABLE 2
BARRELAGE OF THE TOP BREWING COMPANIES AS A PERCENTAGE 
OF TOTAL INDUSTRY SALES FOR SELECTED YEARS
Year
Percent accounted 
for by—
Year
Percent accounted 
for by--
5
Largest
companies
10
Largest
companies
5
Largest
companies
10
Largest
companies
1940 16.3% 23 .7% 1970 50.0% 69.0%
1947 19.0 28 .2 1971 52 .9 70.5
1950 23.4 35 .1 1972 56.9 74.6
1954 24.9 38 .3 1973 59 .0 76.0
1958 28 .5 45.2 1974 64.2 80.8
1963 37.5 56.9 1975 67.0 84.81967 44.4 65.3 1976 69.0 n.a.
SOURCES: Adams, American Industry, pp. 194-5;
"Turmoil Among the Brewers, ft p. 59; and "Advertising
Costs for Beer Ale and Malt Liquor," Advertising Age,
3 November 1975, pp. 28-30.
of the companies would possess 10 percent of the market, 
the smallest 50 percent would possess 50 percent of the 
market, and so on. Line ABC represents the case of 
absolute inequality where one firm possesses 100 percent 
of the market— the monopoly situation.
The data in Table 3 were used to construct the 
Lorenz Curve for the brewing industry in 1975. Table 3 
is simply a list of the largest seventeen brewing com­
panies and their respective market shares for 1975. Table
4 is a market share inequality table. These data are the 
basis for the Lorenz Curve.
The Lorenz Curve for the brewing industry for 1975
17
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Fig. 1. Lorenz Curve: Market share inequality 
of brewing companies, 1975 (solid line) and 1963 (dashed 
line).
indicates that the industry is characterized by a high 
degree of inequality.• A Lorenz Curve for 1963 (determined 
in the same manner) is also illustrated by a dashed line 
in Figure 1. It is almost identical to the Lorenz Curve 
for 1975, which is highly misleading; that is, notwith­
standing the fact that the Lorenz Curves are nearly the 
same, the industry is characterized by a higher degree of 
market share inequality now than in previous years. The
18
TABLE 3
MARKET SHARE OF THE TOP 17 BREWING COMPANIES IN 1975
Company Market share Company Market share
Anheuser-Busch 23 . 9% Heileman 3.1%
Schlitz 15.8 General 3.0
Pabst 10.6 Schmidt 2 .2
Miller 8.7 Genessee 1 05
Coors 8.1 Rheingold 1.3
S chaefer 4.0 Pearl 0.9
Olympia 3.9 Lonestar 0 o 7
S troh 3.5 Pittsburgh 0 o 6
Carling 3.3
SOURCES: Breve r * s A.lmana c, 1976, p. 56; and Beer 
Wholesalers1 News and Monthly Bulletin of the National 
Beer Wholesalers * Association of America, Inc., February 
1970 and February 1976, p. 1.
NOTE: Industry sales were 147,500,000 barrels in 
1975. The market share of the top seventeen brewing 
companies was approximately 95.0 percent. Another way to 
state this (to put it in a form that can be plotted on a 
Lorenz Curve) is that the bottom 66 percent of the brewing 
companies had 5.0 percent of the market.
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TABLE 4
INEQUALITY TABLE, 1975
Cumulative 
number of 
breweries
Cumulative 
percent of 
breweries
Ranking 
of. firms .
Percent 
share of 
JL975 sales
Cumulative 
percent of 
sales
0 0% 0 0.0% 0.0%
33 66
bottom 33 
or 66% 5.0 5.0
40 80
middle 7 
or 14% 10.2 15.2
50 100
top 10 
or 20% 84.8 100.0
NOTE: The data in this table has been derived from 
the data in Table 3. The columns that constitute the data 
points for the Lorenz Curve are the second and the fifth 
columns. Two more sets of coordinates are easily cal­
culated. The first is that the top five brewers (or 10 
percent) possess 67 percent of the market (or, in the 
proper form, the bottom 90 percent possess 33 percent of 
the market). The second is that the top brewer (2 percent) 
has 23.9 percent of the market (or, in the proper form, the 
bottom 98 percent have 76.1 percent of the market). These 
coordinates are also shown in Figure 1.
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Lorenz Curve is misleading because the total number of 
brewing companies has decreased since 1963 in step with 
increases in the market share of the top brewing companies D 
For every year in which data are available, the Lorenz 
Curves are almost identical. In other words, the decreases 
in the number of companies in operation has had an offset­
ting affect on the increases in the market share of the top 
companies (relative to the rest of the industry), to such 
an extent that the market share inequality within the 
industry, as illustrated through the use of a Lorenz Curve, 
appears to have maintained a stable relationship. This 
reveals a limitation in the use of the Lorenz Curve. It 
is not useful for illustrating changes in market share in­
equality when the industry is changing with respect to the 
number of separate companies in operation.
Another measure of the disparity of firm size is
13provided by the Herfindahl Index. The Herfindahl Index 
is defined in the following manner:
N  9
H = 2II(X./T)Z 
i=l 1
where N is the number of firms, is the absolute size of 
each individual firm(i), and T is the total size of the 
market. When all firms are of equal size, H = 1/N. The
13 .Dean A. Worcester, Jr., Monopoly, Big Business,
and Welfare in the Postwar United States (Seattle:
University of Washington Press, 1976), p. 127.
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Herfindahl Index is a measure of dispersion which varies
between 0 and 1. The index approaches 0 when the industry
is composed of a very large number of firms of equal size
14and it is 1 when the industry is a monopoly.
In Table 5 the Herfindahl Indices for the years 
1961 through 1975 have been calculated, along with the 
ratio, 1/N (for years where data was available). The index 
varies from a low of 0.034 in 1961 to a high of 0.120 in 
1975. There is a definite trend toward greater disparity 
in firm sizes; the ratios, 1/N, also reveal this trend.
For instance, in 1963 the Herfindahl Index was 0.041 and in 
1975 the Herfindahl Index was 0.120, while the reciprocal 
of the number of companies (1/N) increased from 0.0067 to 
0.020 during the same period. The increase in the 
Herfindahl Index between 1963 and 1975 coupled with the 
widening of the difference between the index and the ratio 
(for each year, respectively) indicates that the brewing 
industry is becoming more top-heavy (the firms were larger 
and fewer in number in 1975 than they were in 1963).
Ideally, the Herfindahl Index should be constructed 
with complete industry data; that is, with data on the 
market share of every firm in the industry. The indices 
calculated in 'Table 5 are approximations because complete
14 . . . .James V. Koch, Industrial Organization and Prices
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974), 
p. 151.
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TABLE 5
HERFINDAHL INDEX, THE DATA USED IN ITS CONSTRUCTION 
AND THE RATIO 1/N, 1961-1975
Year
Thousands 
of barrels 
sold (T)
Number of 
firms in 
sample
Herfindahl
Index
Number of 
companies in 
market (N) 1/N
1961 88,681.0 17 0.034 n . a . r-. • •
1962 90,657.6 19 .038 n . a . • •
1963 93,251.0 19 .041 150 0 0067
1964 97,852.0 19 .043 n. a . • •
1965 99,453.9 20 .050 n . a . • •
1966 103,853.5 21 .054 n . a . • •
1967 106,785.7 22 .060 93 0 0180
1968 111,048.8 24 .068 n.a. • •
1969 115,792.8 24 .068 n . a . • •
1970 121,600.9 18 .073 n.a. • •
1971 126,438.1 18 .080 n.a. • •
1972 130,166.1 18 .090 n .a. • •
1973 136,822.5 19 .100 n.a. • •
1974 144,196.7 19 .110 n.a. • •
1975 147,500.0 17 0.120 50 0 0200
SOURCES: Bre¥erfs Almanac, 1976, p. 83; "Turmoil 
Among the Brewers," p. 59; Adams, American Industry, p. 194; 
The Brewer's Digest, 1976, pp. 18-36; "Advertising Costs 
for Beer, Ale and Malt Liquor, " Advertising Age, 3 
November 1975, pp. 28-30; and Beer Wholesalers* News and 
Monthly Bulletin of the National Beer Wholesalers * 
Association of America, Inc., February 1970 and 1976, p. 1.
data were not available in published sources. However, the
indices as calculated are an excellent approximation of
the actual indices because of the way they are constructed.
Firms not included are small, with sales generally of less
than a million barrels. Including them in the Herfindahl
Index would have an insignificant effect. This is obvious
from the equation used to calculate the Index. For
2 3
example, the increment to the index for a firm selling
800,000 barrels in 1975 would be only 0.00002 9, which is 
insignificant in relation to the total index of 0,120. 
Assuming the rest of the thirty-three companies in the 
population/industry also had sales of 800,000 barrels, 
then the index would be increased by only 0.00097, which 
is still insignificant.
Causes of Concentration 
Forces that have fostered concentration in the 
brewing industry include the recent Phase IV price con­
trols coupled with raw material price increases (in 
containers and agricultural commodities), increased ver­
tical integration in the industry, the existence of econ­
omies of scale in production, and possible advertising 
returns to scale. Each will be discussed in turn.
Phase IV Price Controls 
President Nixon's Phase IV price controls were 
implemented at a very inopportune time from the standpoint 
of the brewing industry. That is, this policy was insti­
tuted following more than a year of large increases in the 
cost of agricultural commodities. Prior to the grain 
sales to the Soviet Union in 1972, agricultural prices 
were stable. In the ensuing two years, however, prices 
increased 116 percent, reaching a peah at the end of
24
151974. Prices have settled to a more stable level now, 
but they are still approximately 80 percent higher than 
before the onset of the Soviet grain deals. Containers 
have also manifested significant cost increases. From 
the mid 1960s to the start of the price controls, beer 
container prices increased at an average of almost 5 per­
cent per year while beer price increases averaged only 2 
percent per year.^ Thus, price controls were put into 
effect at a time when brewers needed a price increase to 
offset raw material price increases.
Cost pressures increased during the period of price
controls such that within approximately one year following
the lifting of the controls in April 1974, the cost of
glass bottles increased 35 percent, transportation costs
rose 38 percent, and metal container costs were up 35
17percent while beer prices rose only 20 percent. The 
rise in the general level of consumer prices was 11 per­
cent for this period, as measured by the Consumer Price 
Index. Increases in container costs have continued to 
outpace beer price increases and the rate of increase in 
the general level of consumer prices.
15 "Liquor, Basic Analysis," Standard & Poor’s 
Industry Surveys, 24 July 1975, p. L62.
"Liquor, Current Analysis," Standard & Poor*s 
Industry Surveys, 24 July 1975, p. L56.
17See "Liquor, Basic Analysis," p. L62; and 
"Liquor, Current Analysis," p. L52.
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Cost increases coupled with the governmental regu­
lation of prices had the effect of lowering margins for
18brewers (see Table 6)• After the price controls were 
lifted, margins recovered to the pre-price control level.
It is possible that these financial pressures hastened the 
failure of several small marginal local or regional brew­
ers; but the data on the number of companies in operation 
before the price controls and the number in operation 
after they were lifted was not available in published 
sources. Lower margins do, however, make it intrinsically 
more difficult for small brewers to stay in business.
A comparison of the net profit margins by asset 
class (or size of firm) is made in Table 7. It is apparent 
that the largest firms have consistently had the highest 
net profit margins. It would be interesting and revealing 
to observe the changes in the margins during and after the 
price controls, but the data was not available from the 
Internal Revenue Service. It is likely that the margins of 
the small brewers were quite low (in relation to those of 
the large brewers) during this period.
Vertical Integration
Due to increased consumer resistance to higher beer 
prices and a corresponding reluctance by brewers to in­
crease prices in step with increases in the cost of
18 "Liquor, Basic Analysis," p. L62.
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TABLE 6
NET PROFIT MARGINS* (AFTER TAXES ̂ FOR THE 
BREWING INDUSTRY, 1946-1976
Brewing All
Year industry corporations
1946 7.66% n.a.
1947 6.51 n 0a •
1948 5.98 n.a.
1949 6.44 n.a.
1950 5.11 n.a.
1951 3.59 n.a.
1952 n.a. n.a.
1953 3.06 3.7%
1954 2 ,83 3.8
1955 3.20 4.3
1956 2 .45 4.0
1957 2 .62 3.6
1958 2.61 2.9
1959 2 .55 3.2
1960 2.46 2.8
Brewing All
Year industry corporations
1961 2 .40% 3.0%
1962 2 .20 3.0
1963 2.77 3.1
1964 3 .21 3.4
1965 3.28 3.9
1966 3 .40 3.9
1967 3.18 3.7
1968 3.73 3.5
1969 3.62 2.7
1970 3.22 2.1
1971 3.30 2.5
1972 2.17 n.a.
1973 1.65 n.a.
1974 2 .44 n.a.
1975 3.28 n.a.
1976 3.23 n.a.
SOURCES: Brewer1s Almanac, 1976, pp. 40-41; Greer, 
"Product Differentiation," p. 206; "The Ratios of 
Manufacturing," Dun * s Revi ew, November 1973, p. 123; "The
Ratios of Manufacturing," November 1974, p. 123; "The
Ratios of Manufacturing," December 1975, p. 89; and "The
Ratios of Manufacturing," December 1976, p. 91.
*The net profit margins were calculated as a per­
centage of sales.
containers and agricultural commodities, brewers have been
19attempting to improve margins m  two ways; through
19In 1975 the public spent $15.8 billion on beer 
vs. $14.3 billion in 1974, which is an increase of 10.5 
percent. The increase in barrelage was. only 2.8 percent 
as given in "Beverages, Basic Analysis," p. B62. The 
forecasted increase in barrelage was 4.5 percent in "Beer 
Sales Foaming Higher, but Small Breweries go Dry," Industry 
Week:, 23 October 1972, p. 58. "Consumer resistance to 
higher priced beer and a tendency to purchase less
TABLE 7
NET PROFIT MARGINS' AFTER TAXES EXPRESSED AS PERCENTAGES BY ASSET CLASSES, 1955-1971
Asset class 
(thousands of dollars) 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962
$0— under 50 
50— -under 100 -1.1% 1.1% 2.7%
n.a.
-0.2%
n.a. 
n.a.
n.a # 
n.a.
n.a. 
n.a.
n.a. 
n.a.
100— under 250 
250— under 500
J
-0.6
-J
-28.0 - ] -2 .a 0.5% 0.3% 0.3%
n.a. 
n.a.
500— under 1,000 1.0 1.3 1.6 -1.9 J n.a.
1,000— under 5,000 0.9 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.2 -0.2 n.a.
5,000— under 10,000 3.0 2.8 2.5 2.8 1.0 0.7 . 2.0 n.a.
10,000— under 50,000 3.4 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.0 2.8 2.4 n.a.
50,000— under 100,000 4.0 3.4 1.5 2.6 3.2 2.9 3.0 n.a.
100,000'and over 5.0 4.4 4.2 4.1 3.1 3.2 3.4 n.a.
Asset class 
(thousands of dollars) 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
$0— under 50 n.a. 3.0% 3.2% n.a. 1.5% 3.0% n.a. n.a. 0.4%
50— under 100 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
100— under 250 n.a. n.a. 2.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.6% n.a.
250— under 500 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 8.4
500— under 1,000 n.a. 3.6 1.0 3.1% 4.0 2.6 n.a. n.a. 2.7
1,000— under 5,000 0.5% 1.4 1.6 0.9 1.4 2.4 2.8% 2.4 4.1
5,000— under 10,000 2.2 1.9 3.0 0.5 2.9 4.3 5.4 1.6 n.a.
10,000— under 50,000 2.7 3.3 3.1 3.1 2.8 2.7 2.9 2.5 2.2
50,000— under 100,000 3.4 3.4 2.2 2.3 2.7 2.3 2.2 1.4 0.8
100,000—  and over 3.7 3.7 4.4 4.7 4.5 5.5 4.8 4.7 4.7
SOURCE: Brewer*s Almanac, 1967 and 1976, pp. 50 and 52.
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vertical integration and by talking advantage of economies 
of scale in production (the latter will be discussed in 
the next section)•
Vertical integration in the brewing industry has 
been demonstrated chiefly by the larger brewing companies—  
the ones generally possessing more capital available for 
investment in such projects. A  few of the large brewers 
manufacture metal cans for in-house use. Some also own 
farms where hops, barley, rice and other crops essential 
to the brewing of beer are grown. The best example is the 
Adolph Coors Company. Coors produces all of its malt, all 
of its aluminum cans and builds all of its own facilities. 
It has acquired reserves of natural gas and coal, it is in 
the process of acquiring its supplier of glass bottles, and
it has the potential to produce rice in quantities suf-
. . . . 20ficient to meet its annual requirements.
Economies of Scale in Production 
Since the brewing industry is characterized by low
appeared in 1975," U.S. Department of Commerce, Domestic 
and International Business Administration, Bureau of 
Domestic Commerce, 1976 U.S. Industrial Outlook: (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 208. It was 
stated that "Consumer resistance to higher prices and a 
growing tendency to 'trade down' . . . caused some con­
sumers to trade down to a less expensive brand or a cheap­
er type of packaging," in "Drinkers Think Cheaper as Cost 
of Beer Climbs," Advertising Age, 24 February 1975, p. 3. 
Also see, "Liquor, Current Analysis," p. L42; and "Turmoil 
Among the Brewers," p. 67.
20 "Beverages, Basic Analysis," p. B64.
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margins, it is especially important for brewers to care­
fully control and monitor per unit costs of production.
One approach to reducing and controlling unit costs has 
been through plant expansion and automation.
Pursuing the goal of achieving economies of scale 
in production is a more viable objective for the large 
brewers than for the small brewers because of the great 
amount of capital required for plant expansion and mod­
ernization. During the mid to late 1960s, it was proposed 
that a brewery should have an annual capacity of at least
500,000 to 1,000,000 barrels in order to be able to realize
21internal economies of scale. Another author, during the
early 1970s, estimated that a plant must have a capacity
of at least 1,500,000 barrels per year in order to survive
22over the long-run.
The second estimate is higher, probably because 
of increased automation coupled with a continuing refine­
ment of brewing technology. It is likely that plants of 
moderate capacity, such as those in the first estimate 
(500,000 to 1,000,000 barrels), were able to realize 
internal economies of scale in production during the pe­
riod when the estimate was made, but not to a great extent 
relative to the economies of scale that are possible with
21Adams, American Industry, p. 200.
22Glueck, Business Policy, p. 576.
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current technology and levels of automation. In other 
words, the authors of these estimates probably meant that 
plants of the sizes mentioned (in the estimates) were 
capable of realizing internal economies of scale to the 
extent that the plants would have been able to maintain, a 
competitive position relative to the rest of the industry 
(and relative to the time period in which the estimates 
were made). This does not preclude plants of lesser ca­
pacity from realizing internal economies of scale ; but the 
economies of scale achievable (by these smaller plants) 
would probably not be sufficient to ensure their competi­
tiveness and survival over the long-term.
In essence, considering the oligopolistic struc­
ture of the brewing industry with intense rivalry, achiev­
ing economies of scale in production is essential to 
ensuring survival and growth.
In demonstrating the importance of brewery size,
Kenneth Elzinga set up a “survivor test" based on employ-
23 .ment levels. An analysis of Table 8, which contains
the data for the “survivor test", reveals that breweries
with five-hundred or more employees seem to have the best
chance of survival. That is, their numbers have been more
or less stable since 1947, indicating that lafge plants
may have significant operational advantages due to size.
23Adams, American Industry, p. 199.
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TABLE 8
"SURVIVOR TEST" BASED ON EMPLOYMENT, 1947-1972
Year
Total
breweries
Breweries wi th employment levels of:
1-19 20-99 100-499 500-999 1000-1499 2500
1947 440 47 196 166 23 5 31954 301 35 107 120 26 9 4
1958 258 34 88 97 27 9 3
1963 201 21 61 85 23 8 3
1967 185 80 72 21 9 3
1972 167 72 71 15 6 3
SOURCES: Adams, American Industry, p. 199; and 
Brewer's Almanac, 1974 and 1976, p. 37,
From an empirical analysis of current industry data,
breweries with capacities in excess of 1,500,000 barrels 
seem to possess significant internal economies of scale, 
enabling them to remain viable over the long-term« This 
conclusion was arrived at after an examination of levels 
of employment and capacities of the top seventeen com­
panies . The top seventeen companies was assumed to be an 
appropriate sample because there is expected to be only a 
handful of companies in operation in the 1980s, all of 
which will be from among the current top seventeen (see p. 
40). In this sample, the bottom seven companies had em­
ployment levels ranging from 450 to 1,000 and capacities 
ranging from 900,000 to 1,500,000 barrels (each from one 
plant), which indicates (with the data in Table 8 in mind)
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that breweries with employment levels of approximately 
500 to 1,000 and with capacities in the realm of 1,500,000 
barrels may represent the minimum size f.i rm (where capac­
ity and employment are measures of size) that is able to 
achieve sufficient internal economies of scale to survive 
over the long-term. The top end of the sample is charac­
terized by breweries with much greater levels of employ­
ment and capacities. For example, Stroh employs 1,525 
people with a capacity of 5,500,000 barrels from one 
plant; and Coors has an employment of 7500 with a capacity 
of 12,300,000 barrels from one plant.
Large firms in which economies of scale can be 
realized result in lower unit costs of production. For 
example, in 1972 Schlitz had the lowest production cost 
per unit in the industry at $1.08 per barrel with an annual 
capacity of 4.4 million barrels (from two new plants). In 
contrast, Falstaff's production cost per unit for the same
year was $4.39 per barrel with a capacity of 4.1 million
24barrels (from four old plants). A difference of this
magnitude is bound to have a highly detrimental effect on
the profitability of the smaller firm (Falstaff in this
example) over the long-term, which accentuates the impor-
25tance of achieving economies of scale m  production.
24Glueck, Business Policy, p. 576.
25 . . . .Part of the cost differential m  this example
may be attributed to technological factors; that is, the
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The data in Table 9 serves to further demonstrate 
the existence of economies of scale in the industry. This 
table displays the increases in employee productivity 
since 1947 for the industry. As the ratio of barrels pro­
duced per employee-hour has been increasing, the ratio of 
'wages to value of shipments has been decreasing, 1eading 
one to believe that the industry is becoming more capital
intensive in an effort to achieve further economies of 
26scale.
In further support of the proposition that the 
brewing industry is becoming more capital intensive, Table 
10 has been included to show the change in the percentage 
of total wages to total assets from 1955 to 1971. The 
ratio decreases from 27.78 percent in 1955 to 19.49 per­
cent in 1971, which indicates that total wages are dimin­
ishing in importance in relation to'the total level of 
assets. In other words, the industry is investing more in 
plant and equipment than in manpower, resulting in a more 
capital intensive position. Over this same period, outlays 
for total assets increased 113.4 percent as opposed to 49.8 
percent for total wages.
It is possible that increases in the real cost of
newer plants owned by Schlitz may be more advanced than 
Lhe older plants owned by Falstaff, thus contributing to 
the cost differential.
2 6"Turmoil Among the Brewers," pp. 61 and 67.
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TABLE 9
EMPLOYEE PRODUCTIVITY IN TERMS OF BARRELS PER 
HOUR AND THE RATIO OF WAGES TO VALUE
OF SHIPMENTS, 1947-1974   *  __
Year
Barrels 
per hour
Wages to . 
value of 
shipments 
(percent) Year
Barrels 
per hour
Wages to 
value of 
shipments 
(percent)
1947 0.62 16.0% 1962 1.12 13.4%
1949 0.75 14.1 1963 1.20 13.1
1950 0.75 14.2 1964 1.28 12.6
1951 0.73 15.0 1965 1.37 12 .4
1952 0.75 14.6 1966 1.40 12 .4
1953 0.73 15.0 1967 1.49 11.3
1954 0.87 14.0 1968 1.60 11.0
1955 0 o 85 14.0 1969 1.72 10.5
1956 0.88 14.0 1970 1.79 10.0
1957 0.91 13 .8 1971 1.92 9.8
1958 0.97 14.1 1972 2.11 10.1
1959 0.99 14.0 1973 2.21 10.0
1960 1.05 13.6 1974 2.25 9.7
1961 1.07 13.5
SOURCES: Greer, "Product Differentiation," p. 210; 
Brewer*s Almanac, 1976, pp. 20 and 36; U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Annual Survey of 
Manufacturers, 1974; General Statistics for Industry Groups 
and Industries, pp. 3, 12, 23 and 24; and U.S. Department 
of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufacturers, 
1967, special report series: Concentration Ratios in 
Manufacturinq, part 3: Employment, Payrolls, Capital 
Expenditures, and Other General Statistics (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971).
assets has been increasing faster than real wage costs
which would then account for part of the decrease in the
ratio from 1955 to 1971. To investigate this effect, the
data is adjusted by the Consumer Price Index in Table 11.
Total wages in constant dollars decrease by 1.0 percent,
while total assets in constant dollars increase by 41D1
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TABLE 10
TOTAL WAGES, TOTAL ASSETS. AND THE PERCENTAGE 
OF TOTAL WAGES TO TOTAL ASSETS FOR 
THE BREWING INDUSTRY, 1955-1971
Year
Total wages 
($1,000)
Total assets 
($1,000)
Percentage of total wages 
to total assets
1955 $436,388 $1,570,968 27.78%
1956 450,832 1,594,498 28.27
1957 445,361 1,685,101 26.43
1958 443,337 1,651,421 26.84
1959 461,140 1,738,431 26.53
1960 461,698 1,716,753 26.89
1961 466,526 1,728,356 26.99
1962 476,758 n.a. n.a.
1963 470,823 1,796,407 26.21
1964 485,624 1,892,545 25.66
1965 488,056 2,116,744 23.06
1966 509,230 2,138,929 23.81
1967 527,200 2,187,018 24.10
1968 537,000 2,349,914 22.85
1969 570,800 2,868,032 19.90
1970 615,600 3,333,526 18.47
1971 653,600 3,353,354 19.49
SOURCE: Brewer’s Almanac, 1967 and 1976, pp. 36 and
47.
percent over this period. From the table, it is reason­
able to conclude that the brewing industry is becoming 
more captial intensive because of the greater investment 
in assets rather than in manpower; however, it is pos­
sible that the real (or constant) cost of assets has been 
increasing faster than the real cost of wages, thus ac­
counting for part of the decrease in the ratio of total 
wages to Lotal assets from 1955 to 1971. If the cost of 
assets has been increasing faster than increases in the
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TABLE 11
TOTAL WAGES IN CONSTANT DOLLARS AND TOTAL 
ASSETS IN CONSTANT DOLLARS FOR THE 
BREWING INDUSTRY, 1955-1971
Year
Total wages in 
constant dollars 
($1,000)
Total assets in 
constant dollars 
($1,000)
1955 $544,125 $1,958,813
1956 553,848 1,958,843
1957 528,305 1,998,934
1958 511,936 1,906,953
1959 528,524 1,991,330
1960 520,516 1,935,460
1961 520,676 1,928,969
1962 526,223 n.a.
1963 513,438 1,959,004
1964 522,738 2,037,185
1965 516,461 2.239,941
1966 523,899 2,200,544
1967 527,200 2,187,018
1968 515,355 2,255,196
1969 519,854 2,612,051
1970 529,321 2,866,316
1971 538,829 2,764,513:
general level of consumer prices (as measured by the 
Consumer Price Index), then the ratios are shewed slightly 
upward, thus misrepresenting the true nature of the man­
power/capital relationship in the industry. However, it 
is lihely that this affect is minor; the ratios can be 
assumed to be accurate indicators of the manpower/capital 
relationship•
A larger percentage of the total asset base of the 
industry was accounted for by the largest firms in 1971 as 
opposed to 1955 when the industry's assets were spread more
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or less evenly among many different size firms. Table 12 
contains the percentage of assets by asset class (size of 
firm) to total industry assets from 1955 to 1971, and 
demonstrates this change. In 1955, 67.8 percent of the 
total assets were accounted for by the three asset classes, 
encompassing the $1,000,000 to $50,000,000 range. In con­
trast, 66.5 percent of the assets were held by the largest 
firms (those in the $1000,000,000 and over class) in 1971. 
By inspecting the rows of data, it is obvious that the 
smaller asset classes are becoming increasingly less sig­
nificant. The largest three asset classes accounted, for
97.0 percent of the industry assets in 1971, However, it 
is apparent that the $100,000,000 and over class is the 
only class which has a good prospect of continued survival 
and growth•
Figure 2 has been included to more clearly il­
lustrate the change in the dispersion of total assets in 
the industry. The shift in the Lorenz Curve signifies 
that a greater proportion of assets were owned by a smaller 
percent of firms in 1971 than in 1955, revealing a trend 
toward greater inequality in the share of assets within 
the industry, which supports the proposition that the in­
dustry is becoming more concentrated»
Due to low margins and the resulting importance 
of production cost per unit, brewers are investing in new 
large highly automated plants to achieve further economies
TABLE 12
ASSETS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL INDUSTRY ASSETS, BY ASSET CLASS, 1955-1971
Asset class 
(thousands of dollars) 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
$0--under 50 
50--under 100 
100-under 250 
250— under 500 
500— under 1,000
1.000— under 5,000
5.000— under 10,000
10.000— under 50,000
50.000— under 100,000 
100,000 and over
J o . 4% J o . 4 %
1.1%
n.a.
I 1-3*0.6 1.3 —
2.3 1.8 1.5 1.8
12.4 11.2 12.0 9.2
11.3 11.1 12.1 11.9
44.1 42.4 36.2 35.7
9.1 12.3 18.0 13.6
19.8 19.6 19.0 26.5
n.a. n.a. n.a.
13.1
8.2
34.4
16.5 
25.4
8.6
7.3
36.2
17.8
26.6
9.1
5.4
33.2
21.8
28.0
n.a** n.a.
n.a.
2.4% 3.4% 2.6% n.a.
___ n.a. _
n.
ni
n ,
n
n
0.1%
2.4
8.0
3.8
30.0
26.7
28.9
Asset class 
(thousands of dollars) 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
$0— under 50 n.a. 0.1% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
50— under 100 0.1% 0.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
100— under 250 0.2 ‘ 0.2 n.a. n.a. 0.3% n.a. 0.1% n.a.
250— under 500 0.4 0.4 0.2% 0.2% n.a. n.a. 0.2 0.4%
500— under 1,000 1.6 1.6 1.7' 0.6 0.4 n.a. 0.2 0.9
1,000— under 5,000 5.3 3.4 4.1 4.1 3.0 1.7% 3.0 1.7
5,000— under 10,000 2.3 1.5 1.3 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.9 n.a.
10,000— under 50,000 28.8 29.4 27.2 28,3 26.8 19.6 19.1 15.5
50,000— under 100,000 29.9 22 o 3 19.6 16.6 16.6 20.3 13.1 15.0
100,000 and over 31.4 41.1 46.0 49.9 52.6 57.7 63.4 66.5
SOURCE: Brewer*s Almanac, 1967 and 1976, p. 47.
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Fig. 2. Lorenz Curve: Inequality of the dispersion 
of total assets in the brewing industry, 1955 (dashed line) 
and 1971 (solid line)•
of scale. In fact, present plans indicate that total
industry capacity will increase by 30 percent within the
next five years (capacity will increase 10 percent in 1977
alone) while the demand for beer is expected to increase
27only 2 to 3 percent per year over the same time span.
It has been noted that this may lead to problems of over­
capacity (as the economic theory of the firm suggests in
27 'Turmoil Among the Brewers," pp. 61 and 67.
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monopolistic or oligopolistic industries):
• • . many brewers are going to be seriously hurt, and
the ax will fall first on the weaker regionals• The 
reason is basic economics. The secret to the growth of 
national brewers has not been the market share they 
took away from each other through improved marketing 
techniques but, rather, the market share they took 
from the regionals by building more sophisticated 
production f acilities . 28
Because of the competitive cost squeeze amplified
by the planned overcapacity in pursuit of further economies
of scale, it is expected that only fifteen brewers will be
in operation by 1980, and the top five will control 90 per-
29cent of the market.
Advertising and Firm Size in the Brewing Industry
The existence of advertising returns to scale in
the brewing industry is debatable. Kenneth Elzinga stated,
The exact implications of extensive advertising are 
uncertain. But there is evidence of a relationship 
between rising concentration and rising advertising 
expenditures. The extent of a casual relationship 
between these two phenomena is also uncertain.
Professor Yang found that the brewing industry has had, 
over time, an increasing advertising to sales ratio and 
an increasing share of advertising done by the largest firms.30
^^Ibido, pp. 61-62.
29Ibid., p. 62
30 .Adams, American Industry, p. 209. In making this
observation, Kenneth Elzinga was referring to a review of
the following publications: H.M. Mann et al■* "Advertising
and Concentration: An Empirical Investigation," Journal of
Industrial Economics, 16:34 (November 1967); and Charles
Yang, Economic Concentration, Hearings before the U.S.
Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, Part 5,
(Washington, D.C.: 1966), pp. 2153-2163.
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This observation that the ratio of advertising to sales
was increasing over time was based on data from the mid
1960s and earlier. From an inspection of Table 13, it
can be seen that the ratio of advertising to barrels sold
increased somewhat steadily through the mid 1960s, as did
the ratio of advertising to gross sales, supporting
Kenneth Elzinga*s observation. However, more recent data
(also in Table 13) voids this proposal. Both ratios have
decreased significantly in recent' years; and if measured
in constant dollars, the decline would be quite dramatic.
Douglas Greer has explained the relationship in this way,
. . . the rising concentration and growing advertising
outlays do not trace out a perfectly linear positive 
correlation over the period, but rather one that is 
curvilinear— the curvature, parabolic in shape, devel­
oping in the later years when concentration continues 
to rise while outlays as a percentage of sales stabi­
lize at a high level, instead of continuing to rise as 
well. Such a curvilinear correlation is consistent 
with the view that escalating advertising expenditures, 
if a cause of concentration, should not continue to 
rise indefinitely with concentration. . . . once
correlation has reached moderately high levels, outlays 
relative to sales seem to stabilize; and as concentra­
tion proceeds even further, advertising expenditures 
should decline to the monopoly (or collusive) optimum 
level . . . if moderately concentrated and imperfectly
collusive oligopolies may spend more on advertising 
than is in the interest of the industry as a whole, 
levels of concentration beyond this point would be 
expected to hold that kind of cost inflating competi­
tion more effectively under control
Greer's proposition may not be completely valid.
The tremendous amount of planned overcapacity in the
31 "Turmoil Among the Brewers," p. 62.
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TABLE 13
PERCENTAGE OF ADVERTISING TO GROSS 
SALES AND THE RATIO O F  ADVERTISING
TO BARRELS SOLD FOR 
INDUSTRY, 1950
THE BREWING 
-1973
Advertising to Advertising
gross sales per barrel
Year (percent) (dollars)
1950 4.8% $1.39
1951 5.17 1 • 61
1952 n.a. n.a.
1953 5.65 1.86
1954 6.77 2 .30
1955 6.73 2 .27
1956 6.70 2 .31
1957 6.78 2 .48
1958 6.84 2 .48
1959 6.52 2 .47
1960 6.90 2 .56
1961 6.84 2 .56
1962 6.90 2 .44
1963 6.86 2 .61
1964 7.05 2 .59
1965 6.90 2 .62
1966 6.50 2.51
1967 n.a. n.a.
1968 n.a. n.a.
1969 n.a. n.a.
1970 n.a. n.a.
1971 4.80 1.94
1972 4.30 1.75
1973 4.10 1 .67
SOURCES: Greer, "Product Differentiation," p. 211; 
"Advertising Costs for Beer, Ale and Malt Liquor," 
Advertising Age, 3 November 1975, pp. 28-30; and Leo Troy, 
Almanac of Business and Industrial Financial Ratios, 
1974-76, p. 22.
industry for the next ten years may result in an even 
tougher competitive environment. Because of the over­
capacity that is likely to occur, expenditures on
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advertising will probably increase rapidly and there may
be some aggressive price-cutting. This might be expected
because the marketing strategies of the beer industry are
changing from a reliance on price competition to a reliance
on advertising and economies of production.
Now that the efficient brewers are pitted against 
one another, price promotion has become a much less 
important sales tool. "The companies that made it 
big in this business did so because they built big 
and the key to growth was productive efficiency," 
observes Schlitz's Peters. "Now the key to growthis marketing."32
This change in the profile and the marketing of the 
brewing industry may signal the entrance of the industry 
into the maturity pahse of the product life cycle. Miller, 
the fifth ranking brewer in 1974, recently started imple­
menting marketing concepts characteristic of the maturity 
phase— large advertising outlays, new products and segmen­
tation of the market (not just geographically, but also 
demographically and by taste and product appeal), such as 
in the cosmetics industry. Miller is now the third ranking 
brewer. Miller's strategy, which is being followed by the 
rest of the large brewers, is characteristic of the strat­
egies employed during the maturity phase of the product 
life cycle. "The appeal calls for dividing up the U.S. 
beer market into demand segments, producing new products 
and packages specifically for those segments, and then
3 2"Turmoil Among the Brewers," p. 62.
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spending with abandon to promote t h e m .  "33 Coors serves 
as a contradictory example, in that the demand for their 
"mysterious" brand consistently outpaces production, with 
a reliance on medieval marketing practices and very little 
advertising.
Because the market for beer is relatively mature, 
it follows that the level of advertising is not as much of 
a causal factor in the absolute level of beer consumption 
as it was in previous years; but the share of advertising 
by each company will have a great effect on the demand for 
one brand versus the demand for some other brand. In other 
words, advertising will not be aimed so much at finding new 
beer drinkers as it will be aimed at convincing current 
beer drinkers to switch brands.
Summary
Technological and sociological forces, both en­
dogenous and exogenous to the brewing industry, have been 
responsible for the trend toward concentration of brewers• 
The industry used to be characterized by many small firms, 
now it is composed of a few very large firms and a handful 
of smaller ones. In other words, it is becoming more 
oligopolistic (as demonstrated through use of the Lorenz 
Curve), due to several interindustry and intraindustry 
forces. First, there are legal battles between the large
33Ibid., p 0 60.
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and small brewing companies and the government concerning 
antitrust and questionable marketing practices. Second, 
are environmental issues concerning the desirability (or 
undesirability) of nonreturnable containers and metal cans 
with pull-tabs. Third, shifts in the population profile 
are expected. The main beer drinking segment, the 18 to 
34 age group, is expected to stabilize and to eventually 
decline in numbers.
Specific causes of concentration were analyzed. 
First, the Phase IV price controls squeezed brewer's mar­
gins during a period when the nation was experiencing 
"double-digit" inflation. Second, there has been increased 
vertical integration in the industry— in an effort by brew­
ers to lower the costs of containers and agricultural com­
modities. Third, the largest firms have been striving to 
attain greater economies of scale in production. The 
extent of investment and planned investment in new plant 
and equipment is so great that there will be a threatening 
overcapacity in 5 to 10 years, resulting in an acute 
•competitive environment. And fourth, the existence of pos­
sible advertising returns to scale was discussed. Dif­
fering viewpoints were presented, and it was concluded 
that the presence of returns to scale in advertising is 
doubtful. The goal of advertising is to take market share 
away from the small regional brewers; and then, when the 
industry is highly consolidated (oligopolistic), its
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objective will be to ensure that market share is main- 
34tamed •
Because the industry is becoming highly concentra­
ted and marketing strategies are changing, it was concluded 
that the industry is entering the maturity phase of the 
product life cycle.
34Ibid., p. 61.
CHAPTER III
BEER IN MONTANA
The Montana Brewing Industry 
In 1863 the first brewery in Montana commenced 
operations in Virginia City, operated by Henry S. Gilbert. 
The Kessler Brewing Company, established in 1865 in Helena, 
was an early leader in the brewing industry. It was the 
first brewery in Montana to install a refrigerating machine 
and it was the first brewery in the United States to pur­
chase a carbonic acid gas machine.^"
Several other breweries serving local markets
were established by adventurous entrepreneurs in Montana,
2with a peak of eleven operating m  1937. Three brewer­
ies were located in Great Falls: The Montana Brewing Com­
pany, established in 1894; The American Brewing and Malt-
3m g  Company, established m  1892; and the Great Falls
^One Hundred Years of Brewing: A Complete History 
of the Progress Made in the Art, Science and Industry of 
Brewing in the World, Particularly During the Nineteenth 
Century (Chicago: H.S. Rich and Co., 1903; reprint ed.,
New York: Arno Press, 1974), p. 445.
2"Economic Squeeze Gets too Tight: Great Falls 
Brewery to Close," Great Falls Tribune, 17 July 1968,
p . 10.
3One Hundred Years of Brewing, no page.
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Brewery. These small breweries started shutting down in 
the 1940s until there was just one brewery left in the 
state, the Great Falls Brewery.
In 1969, the Great Falls Brewery finally ceased 
operations. The reason, as explained by Fred G. Wessinger, 
the brewery's president, was the "Economic conditions be­
yond our control were responsible." Wessinger also said, 
"The severe inflationary trend and high production costs
brewers are currently experiencing without offsetting price
. . . 4adjustments for the finished product are responsible."
Beer became legal throughout the state of Montana 
on April^7, 1933, at a 4 percent maximum alcoholic content0 
In 1933, the state tax was $1.00 per barrel compared to 
$3.25 per barrel in 1976, which is still well below the 
national average of approximately $4.70 per barrel. Add­
itionally, the Federal excise tax on beer has increased from 
$1.00 per barrel in 1862 to $9.00 per barrel in 1976.^ It 
appears that the current)taxes, both state and Federal, 
are much lower, on a constant dollar basis, than they were 
in the early years of the brewing industry. Beer was 
either overtaxed when the industry was in its infancy or 
it is undertaxed now.
4"Economic Squeeze," p. 1.
^Brewer1s Almanac, 1976, pp. 94-106.
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Statewide Demand for Beer 
Since the repeal of the eighteenth ammendment, 
per capita consumption of beer in the state of Montana 
has been steadily increasing. At the end of 1974, Montana 
had the fourth highest per capita consumption in the nation 
(at 28.5 gallons); this slipped to 28*3 gallons by the end 
of 1975, ranking the state in fifth p l a c e . ^
Table 14 has been included in order to clearly 
display the changes in statewide beer consumption. To 
facilitate empirical comparisons between population changes 
and changes in beer demand, percentage increases (or de­
creases) have been calculated for each category.
Although the total population of Montana has been 
increasing at an average of only 0.6 percent per year since 
1961, adult (over twenty-one) population has been in­
creasing at an average of 1.0 percent per year (almost 
two times faster). Total beer consumption, on the other 
hand, has been increasing at an average of 3.5 percent per 
year (over five times faster than total population)• A 
surprising statistic is that, although adult population 
is increasing faster than total population (1.0 percent as 
compared to 0.6 percent), the increase in average adult per 
capita beer consumption (2.5 percent) is lagging behind 
average total per capita consumption (3.0 percent). One
6Ibid0, p. 59.
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TABLE 14
COMPARATIVE STATISTICS FOR MONTANA: TOTAL POPULATION, 
BEER CONSUMPTION AND PERCENT CHANGES, 1961-1975
Total Beer
Year
population 
(thousands)
Percent
change
cons umpt i on 
(barrels)
Percenl
change
1961- 695 •  •  •  • 423,495 ( • t •
1962 696 0.1% 432,509! 2.1%
1963v 701 0.7 444,223j 2.71964 703 0.3 448,787l 1.0
1965,- 702 -0.1 465,09l| 3.6
1966 702 I •  •  •  • 470,742 j 1.21967 — 701 I -0.1 492,787! 4.7
1968 693 j -1.1 484,354 -1 .7
1969- 694 i5
K
0.1 499,371 3.1
1970 694 •  •  •  • 554,161 11.01971 v 703 1.7 578,905 4.5
1972 719 1.6 580,261 0.2
1973 - 721 0.3 644,850 11.1
1974 735 1.9 675,771 4.8
1975 _ 748 1.8 683,666 1.2
Total change 7.6% 61 o 4%
Average change 0.6% 3 . 5%
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TABLE 14 - - Con t. i nued
COMPARATIVE STATISTICS FOR MONTANA: PER CAPITA 
CONSUMPTION, ADULT POPULATION AND 
PERCENT CHANGES, 1961-1975
Per capita Adult
consumption Percent population Percent
Year (gallons) change (thousands) change
1961 18.81 • • • • 399 • • • •
1962 19*2/i 2.1% 3 94 -1.2%1963 19.6/ 2.1 395 0.21964 19.7 | 0.5 397 0.5
1965 20.4 / 3.6 397 • o • •
1966 20.8 I 2.0 395 -0.5
1967 21 .8 j 4.8 396 0.2
1968 21 .7 I -0.4 403 1.8
1969 22.3 1 2.8 400 -0.7
1970 24.1 I 8.1 405 1.2
1971 25.4 | 5.4 413 2.0
1972 25.0 -1.6 428 3.6
1973 27.7 1 
28.5 I
10.8 434 1.4
1974 2.9 447 3.0
1975 28.3 -0.7- 459 2.7
Total change 
Average change
50.5%
3.0%
15.0% 
1.0% .
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TABLE 14— Continued
COMPARATIVE STATISTICS FOR MONTANA: ADULT PER CAPITA 
CONSUMPTION, PER CAPITA PERSONAL INCOME 
AND PERCENT CHANGES, 1961-1975
Adult
per capita Per capita
Year
consumpt ion 
(gallons)
Percent
change
personal
income
Percent
change
1961 32.9 • • • • $1920 • < • • •
1962 34.0 3.3% 2207 14.9%
1963 34.9 2.6 2197 -0.4
1964 35.0 0.3 2255 2.6
1965 36.3 3.7 2436 8.4
1966 36.9 1.6 2615 7.3
1967 38.6 4.6 2759 5.5
1968 37.3 -3.4 2917 5.7
1969 38.7 3.8 3124 7.1
1970 42.4 9.6 3381 8.2
1971 43.5 2.6 3479 2.9
1972 42.0 -3.4 3897 12.0
1973 46.1 9.8 4418 13.4
1974 46.9 1.7 4776 8.1
1975 46.2 -1.5 5434 13.8
Total change 40.4% 183.0%
Average change 2.5% bo
SOURCES: Brewer • s Almanac, 1967 and 1976, pp.
56,59 and 64; and U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau 
of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962-1975).
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would expect that the average increase in adult per capita 
consumption would be the larger of the two, especially in 
light of the fact that the 18 to 34 age qroup (the age 
group believed to be the heaviest beer drinking segment)
has been increasing much faster than the rest of the pop-
7 . . .ulation since the early 1960s. The disparity is due to
data limitations. First, data are not available on the per 
capita beer consumption of the 18 to 34 age group. If it 
was available, it is likely that the average percentage 
increase per year for this segment would be higher than for 
any other segment•
Second, the twenty-one and over segment includes 
the oldest age groups, which do not/consume high amounts of 
beer; and it excludes the 16 to 20 year olds, who consume 
large amounts of beer, thus distorting the data.
Also, the lowering of the legal drinking age to 
eighteen in 1971 may have had an effect that is not ac­
counted for by the data. Information on the possible 
changes in drinking patterns since the lowering of the 
legal drinking age is not available.
As a note of interest, per capita personal income 
has been included in Table 14. The average increase has 
been 7.8 percent per year which is over eleven times 
greater than the average increase in total population.
7"Liquor, Current Analysis," p. L57.
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This indicates that the population is becoming much more 
affluent (as measured in current dollars). Table 15 
reinforces this conclusion. Per capita personal income 
has been adjusted by the Consumer Price Index to show 
per capita personal income in constant dollars• The 
average increase in per capita personal income in constant 
dollars is 3.4 percent per year (or over five times greater 
than the average increase in total population).
Increases in affluence coupled with increases in 
the demand for avocational or leisure activities, changing 
attitudes toward alcoholic beverages (from negative to 
positive), lowering the legal drinking age, the growth 
of the 18 to 34 age group relative to the rest of the pop­
ulation, and more and better advertising and marketing by 
the brewers have resulted in large increases in the con- 
sumption of beer in Montana.
Demand is also related to price but since price is 
determined in conjunction with supply factors, a discussion 
of the price of beer in Montana is presented in the next 
section.
8Ibid., pp. L56-L57.
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TABLE 15
COMPARATIVE STATISTICS FOR MONTANA: PER CAPITA 
PERSONAL INCOME AND PER CAPITA PERSONAL 
INCOME IN CONSTANT DOLLARS, 1961-1975
CPI
adjusted
Per capita Consumer per capita
personal Percent Price personal PercentYear income change Index income. change
1961 $1920 • • • 89.6 $2143 • # •
1962 2207 14.9% 90.6 2436 13.7
1963 2197 -0.4 91.7 2396 -1.61964 2255 2.6 92 .9 2427 1.3
1965 2436 8.0 94.5 2578 6.2
1966 2615 7.3 97.2 2690 4.3
1967 2759 5.5 100.0 2759 2.6
1968 2917 5.7 104.2 2799 1.4
1969 3124 7.1 109.8 2845 1.6
1970 3381 8.2 116.3 2907 2.2
1971 3479 2.9 121 .3 2868 -1.3
1972 3897 12 .0 125.3 3110 8.4
1973 4418 13.4 133.1 3319 6.7
1974 4776 8.1 147.7 3234 -2.6
1975 5434 13.8 161.2 3371 4.2
Total change 183.0% 57.3%
Average change 7.8% 3.4%
SOURCES: Brewer's Almanac, 1967 and 1976, p. 64 ;
and Helen Axel, ed., A Guide to Consumer Markets: 1975/
1976 (New York: The Conference ;Board, Inc., 1975), p. 242.
Statewide Supply of Beer
Legal Barriers to Entry
The state of Montana has erected legal barriers 
limiting the entry of new retail liquor/beer establishments 
into the market through the utilization of a quota system. 
All incorporated towns receive two basic beer permits
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(which includes two basic liquor permits), regardless of 
population. However, the higher the population within an 
incorporated area, the greater the number of basic beer/ 
liquor permits available to that incorporated area. An 
incorporated area is the city plus a circle around the city 
with a five mile radius (from the city limits, not from 
the city center). Outside the incorporated areas, permits 
are granted according to convenience and necessity, which 
is determined by the Liquor Division of the Department of 
Revenue in Helena. No applications have been denied to 
date •
At present, there are no restrictions on the number 
of permits available for the licensing of retail outlets 
selling beer for off-premises consumption within incorpor­
ated areas; however, permits for on-premises consumption 
are extremely difficult to obtain because the quotas are 
all filled, with the exception of one basic beer/liquor 
permit available in Great Falls. The only way an entre­
preneur can start a new beer/liquor outlet is to either 
purchase an existing outlet (under close coordination with 
the Liquor Division of the Department of Revenue to ensure 
that the permit is properly transferred), or to get on the 
waiting list for permits (licenses will be awarded as per­
mits become available).
As a note of interest, the state charges from $400 
to $1200 each year for a basic permit. If two permits are
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granted (one for beer and one for liquor), then the fee is
double. Also, the city may require a licensing fee, if
desired; but it must be less than or equal to the state's
fee. Currently, all cities in Montana levy the maximum 
9fee.
Wholesale and Retail Prices 
Compared to the rest of the nation, wholesale and 
retail prices of beer in Montana have been extremely 
stable,^ That is, there are no minor local brands 
employing price-cutting marketing tactics and creating an 
unstable retail atmosphere. All beer sold within the 
state of Montana is brewed by large national or regional 
brewers who seem to be content with the stable nature of 
the price structure.
Distributors are prohibited by law from granting 
quantity discounts or other special concessions to their 
retail customers. Consequently, the distributors (of each 
particular brand) must charge the same price to each re­
tailer regardless of the size of the order, the quality of 
the account, etc. Periodically, distributors are allowed
9 .Informationm the previous three paragraphs was 
obtained during a telephone interview with Thomas J. 
Mulholland, Liquor Division of the Department of Revenue, 
Helena, Montana, 3 January 1977.
■^Interview with Elton M. Andrew, retired, U.S. 
Brewer's Association, Helena, Montana, 26 January 1977.
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to offer specials to their retail customers;^ but there
can be no discrimination— all retail customers must have
. . . . 12the opportunity to participate m  these specials.
During January 1977, the wholesale price of a
13case of Olympia was $5.45. The range m  retail prices
was quite wide. The price charged by Buttrey Food Stores
was $6.45 (retail), resulting in a markup (based on the
retail selling price) of 15.5 percent; whereas, the price
charged by Albertson's Food Center was $6.60, resulting
in a markup of 17.4 percent. Circle K Food Stores charged
$7.48, which is a markup of 27.1 percent. An indication
that beer prices within Montana have been stable over time
14is that the markup has been stable for several years.
Table 16 provides a listing of wholesale beer 
prices (for Olympia) for selected years since 1959 in
Example of a special: when Coors entered the 
Great Falls market during the first week of December, 1976, 
the special took the form of an acrossOthe-board price cut 
for 3 to 4 weeks. The typical six-pack (six 12 oz cans) 
was priced at $*1.59; Coors* price was $1.43.
12 . . .The information m  this paragraph was obtained
during an interview with Karl Rembe, Manager, Pennington's, 
Inc., Great Falls, Montana, 4 January 1977.
13 .Olympia has been chosen because it is the market
leader in Great Falls. And from empirical observations, 
it has a middle-of-the-road stable price that can be as­
sumed to be representative of general beer price movements.
14Interview with Robert Bruskotter, Jr., Manager, 
Buttrey Food Stores, Holiday Village Branch, Great Falls, 
Montana, 21 January 1977.
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TABLE 16
WHOLESALE PRICE PER CASE FOR 
OLYMPIA BEER FOR SELECTED 
YEARS, 1959-1977
Year Wholesale price
1959 $3.55
1962* 3 • 55
1968 3.65
1969 4.25
1971 4.25
1972 4.60
1973 4.85
1974 5.00
1975 5.25
1976 5.45
1977 5.45
SOURCES s Interview with Karl Rembe, Manager, 
Pennington's, Inc., Great Falls, Montana, 4 January 1977$ 
and Interview with Robert Bruskotter, Jr., Manager, 
Buttrey Food Stores, Holiday Village Branch, Great Falls, 
Montana, 21 January 1977.
*Olympia switched from 11 oz cans to 12 oz cans
in 1962.
Great Falls. Data for the missing years was not available.
An inspection of Table 17 reveals that increases in 
the general level of beer prices (as measured by the whole­
sale price index for malt beverages) have not been Keeping 
pace with increases in the general level of consumer prices 
(as measured by the Consumer Price Index). Furthermore, 
this lag is even more apparent when the wholesale prices 
are adjusted by the wholesale price index for malt bever­
ages; that is, the wholesale prices in constant dollars 
have remained relatively stable since 1959, at least in
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TABLE 17
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX, WHOLESALE PRICE INDEX FOR MALT 
BEVERAGES, WHOLESALE PRICE PER CASE FOR OLYMPIA BEER
IN CONSTANT DOLLARS, AND PER CAPITA PERSONAL INCOME
IN CONSTANT DOLLARS FOR SELECTED YEARS, 1959-1975
Per capita
Wholesale Wholesale personal
Consumer price index price in income in
Price for malt constant constant
Year Index beverages dollars dollars
1959 87.3 97.8 $3.63 $2266
1962 90.6 97.2 3.65 2436
1968 104.2 101.5 3.60 2799
1969 109.8 103.1 4.12 2845
1971 121 .3 110.2 3.86 2868
1972 125.3 110.8 4.15 3110
1973 133 .1 111.6 4.34 3319
1974 147.7 121 .9 4.10 3234
1975 161.2 136.5 3.85 3371
SOURCES: Brewer’s Almanac, 1976, p. 54; and Heler
Axel, ed., A Guide to Consumer Markets: 1975/1976 (New
York: The Conference Board, Inc. , 1975), p. 242.
comparison to the general level of consumer prices. From 
these real prices, beer appears to be a bargain. If the 
wholesale price index exhibits large increases for 1976 and 
1977 (as expected from the trend of past increases), then 
beer will be priced lower (in constant dollars) than it was 
several years ago. For example, assume that the wholesale 
price index for malt beverages is 148.0 for 1976 and 160.0 
for 1977 (both being conservative extrapolations). Then 
the wholesale price in constant dollars would be $3.68 for 
1976 and $3.41 for 1977. In other words, consumers (in 
Great Falls) are spending a smaller percentage of their
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personal incomes on beer now than they did several years 
ago (assuming a constant level of beer consumption, of 
course). To substantiate this, per capita personal income 
in constant dollars has been included in Table 17. From 
this data, it can be seen that the wholesale price of a 
case of beer in constant dollars was 0.16 percent of per 
capita personal income in constant dollars in 1959; 
whereas, it was 0.11 percent in 1975. It is likely that 
this percentage will decrease even further for 1976 and 
1977 (based on the wholesale prices in constant dollars 
estimated above, and the steep upward trend in per capita 
personal incomes).
Market Structure 
The market structure in Montana seems to fit the 
monopolistically competitive model better than the other 
three major market structure models (pure competition, 
monopoly and oligopoly)• The monopolistically competitive 
model is characterized by low economic profit, product 
differentiation and many competitors who have little con­
trol over price. The characteristics of the Montana mar­
ket structure are similar in that beer is a relatively low 
margin product, a large number of brands are available and 
the prices of the brands are nearly the same at each retail 
outlet. Major differences in prices are due to service 
differentials at the various outlets. A convenience outlet 
such as Circle K Food Stores charges a much higher price
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than a large discount outlet such as Buttrey Food Stores, 
Each brewer can differentiate its brand from 
those of rival brewers, primarily through packaging and 
advertising. More consumer loyalty for a particular brand 
is dependent on greater differentiation of that brand, 
Excellent examples are Coors and Miller. Miller, through 
greatly increased advertising stressing product differ­
entiation, has achieved a large amount of consumer loyalty 
in recent years. Coors, on the other hand, has a tremen­
dous amount of consumer loyalty with little reliance on 
advertising. Instead, differentiation was achieved with 
a product that is actually different; the product is non­
pasteurized. Coors is a "mysterious" product in the minds 
of the consuming public and this is the main contributor 
to the product*s success. Other examples include Budweiser 
and Michelob. Both are highly differentiated products, 
attendant with a great amount of consumer loyalty.
Within the state of Montana, each brewer seems to 
make its marketing decisions independently of other brew­
ers; that is, market action by one brewer does not seem to 
trigger retaliatory market action by other brewers. For 
example, when Coors entered the Great Falls market in 
December of 1976, the price of a six-pack of Coors was 
generally about sixteen cents less than the average.
Prices of other brands remained stable throughout Coors* 
market penetration phase. Currently, the product is well-
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established and priced generally about six cents higher 
than the average•
In short, the monopolistically competitive model 
seems to fit the structure of the Montana beer market 
better than other market structure models; and it is fully 
consistent with the statewide price stability.
CHAPTER IV
DEMAND CHARACTERISTICS
The consumption of beer exhibits a long-term pos­
itive trend with pronounced seasonal variations. The 
purpose of this chapter is to analyze and model these 
variations and then to generate forecasts of future beer 
consumption.
Seasonal Variation
Demand for beer in Montana, and in the rest of the 
nation, is definitely seasonal. An inspection of Figure 3 
reveals this obvious seasonal effect. Consumption is high 
during the summer -when the temperatures are the highest. 
Conversely, consumption is relatively low during the cold 
winter months, with one exception--there is a noticeable 
surge in consumption during the end-of-the-year holidays.
Figure 4, in addition to further demonstrating the 
seasonal variation, indicates the presence of a positive 
(or upsloping) trend component in beer consumption.
There is not enough data to determine if a cyclical 
component is present; that is, per capita beer consumption 
has been steadily increasing since prohibition (with no 
long-run peaks and troughs apparent). Therefore, the
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possibility of a long-run cycle in beer consumption will 
not be considered in this study.
The remainder of this section focuses on an an­
alysis of the seasonal component of the demand for beer
\in Montana, from three perspectives. First, the seasonal 
component is isolated by the method of ratio to moving 
average and a forecast of expected beer consumption is 
generated. Following this, -the seasonal component is 
isolated through the use of dummy variables (on a quarter­
ly basis as opposed to a monthly bases due to computer 
limitations), and a forecast is generated. Finally, the 
unadjusted seasonal data is analyzed with respect to 
average monthly temperatures in order to determine the 
extent of correlation between these two variables.
Isolating the Seasonal Component 
The Method of Ratio to Moving Average 
In this section the method of ratio to moving 
average is used in isolating the seasonal variation from 
the time series data (monthly beer consumption in Mon­
tana, 1968-1975).
The method is based on the multiplicative assump­
tion of time series data; that is, letting Y = beer 
consumption, C = the cyclical component, S = the seasonal 
component, T = the trend component and I = the irregular 
component, an equation that explains the final demand for
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beer is Y = CSTI.^ Since it is assumed that the cyclical 
component is not present, Y = STI.
The first step in isolating the seasonal component 
involves estimating T through the use of a centered twelve 
month moving average. Next, an estimate of SI is obtained 
by dividing the original data by T: SI = STI/T. The values 
of SI are called the specific seasonal relatives; and since 
they are theoretically free of T (and C, if present), they 
are very useful in analyzing the nature of the seasonal 
variation in the time series.
A plot of the specific seasonal relatives is shown
2 . .m  Figure 5. According to this figure, the seasonal
pattern appears to be stable; that is, it is not changing 
over time. An unstable seasonal pattern may present it­
self by changes in either amplitude or timing, or both. In 
this data, the timing is stable— the peaks are always in 
midsummer and the troughs are always in midwinter. Because 
the amplitude is also stable, it is assumed that the time 
series is seasonally stable.
Table 18 reinforces this conclusion. Reading the 
table horizontally, the data appears to be irregular— it
■'"Ya-Lun Chou, Statistical Analysis; With Business 
and Economic Applications (New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, Inc., 1968), p. 569.
2 .In reference to Figure 5 and Table 18, six months
of data were lost at each end of the time series in the
computation of the moving average.
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TABLE 18
SPECIFIC SEASONAL RELATIVES, 1968-1975
Month 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
J anuary • • • 74.3 74.6 67.6 75.4 83.8 76.1 81.6
February 1 • • 69.2 78.9 74.2 83.1 77.1 76.3 65.8
March • • • 102 .2 103.8 98.9 110.1 111 .6 93.0 91.4
April • • • 113.7 129.1 108.6 101.7 102.6 97.3 109.6
May • • • 125.2 103.0 104.9 102.2 119.3 135.7 111.5
June • • • 143.6 114.8 138.8 116.6 130.8 134.3 135.2
July 135.0 112 .5 122 .1 128.5 111.8 106.5 127.1 • • •
August 120.9 106.4 120.7 126.0 148.7 140.1 119.4 • • •
September 91.1 107.8 103.1 97.6 100.5 87.8 92.2 • • •
October 77.5 80.7 98.5 74.0 79.4 80.4 90.3 • • •
November 79.2 67.3 75.3 87.6 83.4 81.2 80.6 • • •
December 85.6 91.6 92.5 87.2 70.6 90.0 86.4 • • •
is not steadily increasing or decreasing; which means that 
there is not a trend component in the amplitude of the 
specific seasonal relatives, indicating a stable seasonal 
pattern. If the seasonal variations are not stable, then 
a more complicated procedure must be used in isolating the 
seasonal component.
In isolating S from SI, the irregular component is
. . .  3assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of zero;
therefore, by using the median of the raw monthly values 
as an estimate of S, the seasonal component is theoreti­
cally isolated. The median is better than the mean for 
taking the irregular component out because it is not af­
fected by extreme high or low variations in the data.
3 .Ya-Lun Chou, Statistical Analysis, p. 576.
73
When S, the seasonal component, is isolated, it is 
called the seasonal index and is used in seasonally adjust­
ing the raw data. See Table 19 for a listing of the sea­
sonal indices•
TABLE 19
SEASONAL INDICES
Month Seasonal Index
January 74.3
February 75.9
March 101.1
April 112 .8
May 118.6
June 128.7
July 119.8
August 127.1
September 97.4
October 85.9
November 77.1
December 81.3
Finally, the seasonally adjusted data is obtained 
by dividing the raw data by the corresponding seasonal 
index; or, in the multiplicative form, TI = STI/S. In 
other words, the seasonally adjusted data is a function of 
the trend and irregular components.
In search of a good mathematical relationship to 
describe the seasonally adjusted data, the following models 
were applied to the portion of the time series from .1 971 to 
1975: the simple linear regression model of the form 
Y = a + b(X), where X is time and Y is the seasonally 
adjusted data; the Cobb-Douglas type of function of the
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form Y = a(X) or, in linear form, logY = loga + blogX; the
polynomial regression model of the form Y = a + b ( X )  +
2 3c(X) + d(X) ; and the exponential regression model of the
form Y = a(b) or, in linear form, logY = loga + Xlogbo
From Rn analysis of the regression statistics, the
exponential model was the model of best fit. The coef-
2ficient of determination (R ) was 0.431 and the t-values 
and the F-ratio were significant at the 95 percent con­
fidence level (which was used throughout this study).
Also, the Durbin-Watson Statistic indicated that serial 
correlation was not significant. The estimated regression
equation was Y = 46.2(1,004) , with January of 1971 as the
(2634)(57.3)
base period (where X is 1). The t-values for each estimat­
ed regression coefficient are shown in parentheses below 
their respective coefficients. This format was contin­
ued throughout this study. Based on the estimated regres­
sion equation, the forecasts of monthly beer consumption 
along with the forecasts at the 95 percent confidence level 
for twenty-four months are shown in Table 20. The standard 
error of the estimate was 4.763. With the exponential re­
gression model, beer consumption in Montana is expected to 
grow at 7.8 percent during 1976 and 5.2 percent during . 
1977.
Four Quarter Data With Dummy Variables
In this section the seasonal data was grouped on a
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TABLE 20
FORECASTED MONTHLY BEER CONSUMPTION AND ESTIMATES AT 
THE 95 PERCENT CONFIDENCE LEVEL FOR MONTANA
IN THOUSANDS OF BARRELS, 1976-1977
1976
95 Percent confidence interval
Month Forecast Low High
Jan 44.9 35.4 54.4
Feb 46.0 36.5 55.5
Mar 61.6 52.1 71.1
Apr 69.0 59.5 78.5
May 72.9 63.4 82 .4
Jun 79.4 69.9 88.9
Jul 74.3 64.8 83 o 8
Aug 79.1 69.6 88 .6
Sep 60.9 51.4 70.4
Oct 54.0 44.5 63 .5
Nov 48 .6 39.1 58 .1
Dec 51 .5 42.0 61.0
Totals 742 .2 627.9 856.5
1977
95 Percent confidence interval
Month Forecast Low High
Jan 47.3 37.8 56.8Feb 48.5 39.0 58 .0
Mar 64.9 55.4 74.4
Apr 72.8 63.3 82.3
May 76.8 67.3 86.3
Jun 83.7 74.2 93.2
Jul 78.3 68.8 87.8Aug 83.4 73.9 92.9
Sep 64.2 54.7 73.7
Oct 56.9 47.4 66.4
Nov 51.3 41.8 60.8
Dec 54.3 44.8 63.8
Totals 782.5 668.1 896.7
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quarterly basis (starting with January) in order to use 
dummy variables to facilitate the analysis of the seasonal 
variation in the time series• See Figure 6 for a plot of 
the quarterly data. Two regression models were utilized.
A linear regression of the form Y = a + b(X) + e(B2 ) + 
d(D^) + e(D^) was performed where the Ds represent dummy 
variables. Also a polynomial regression of the form 
Y = a + b(X) + c(X^) + d(X^) + e(X^) was performed.
The linear regression model provided the best fit
2 . . .with an R of 0.933, a significant F-ratio and an accept­
able Durbin-Watson Statistic. All but one of the t-values
were significant--the one for the coefficient of D 2 was
not, thus the estimated regression equation was Y = 89.04 +(22.0)
1.98(X) + 3.73(D9) + 52•55(D~) + 47.21(D ), where X is 1
(12.6) (0.9) (12.8) (11.5)
4for the first quarter of 1968. The forecasts for 1976 and 
1977 are shown in Table 21 along with the estimates at the
4The dummy variables were assigned a value of either 
0 or 1 for each quarter as shown below. The pattern is 
repeated each year•
Year 1 Year 2
Quarter D2 D3 D4 Quarter D2 D3 D
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
2 0 1 0 2 0 1 0
3 0 0 1 3 0 . 0 1
4 0 0 0 4 0 0 0
Thus, the basic time series regression line Y = 89.04 + 
1.98(X) was for fourth quarter sales. Variations due to 
season were then adjusted for by the respective dummy 
variables.
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TABLE 21
FORECASTED QUARTERLY BEER CONSUMPTION AND ESTIMATES AT 
THE 95 PERCENT CONFIDENCE LEVEL FOR MONTANA IN 
THOUSANDS OF BARRELS, 1976-1977
1976
95 Percent confidence interval
Quarter Forecast Low High
1 160.1 143.8 176.4
2 208.9 192 .6 225.2
3 205.6 189.2 221.9
4 160.3 144.0 176.6
Totals 734.9 669.6 790.1
1977
Quarter Forecast
95 Percent confidence interval
Low High
1 166.0 149.6 182.3
2 216.8 200.4 233 .1
3 213.5 197.2 229.84 168.2 151.8 184.5
Totals 764.6 696.8 829.7
95 percent confidence level (the standard error of the 
estimate was 8.173). Also, the actual and forecasted 
quarterly data plus the fourth quarter trend line are shown 
in Figure 6. The fourth quarter trend line is a function 
of the estimated regression equation less the dummy vari­
ables, or Y = 89.04 + 1,98(X). Using the linear regression 
model with dummy variables, beer consumption would be ex­
pected to grow 7.4 percent during 1976 and 4.0 percent
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during 1977.
The exponential model used in the previous section 
for forecasting monthly beer consumption had a wider con­
fidence interval than the linear model used in this section 
for forecasting quarterly beer consumption* The variations 
for 1976 and 1977 with the exponential model were 26.7 per­
cent and 25.5 percent, respectively, as opposed to varia­
tions of 15.2 percent and 16.0 percent for the linear model.
Beer Consumption and Average Monthly Temperatures
This section has been included in order to deter­
mine the extent of correlation, if any, that exists between 
beer consumption and temperature. The temperatures were 
obtained from the National Weather Service and are monthly 
averages of readings taken at the Great Falls International 
Airport.
A series of regressions was performed on the sea­
sonal beer consumption data and the average monthly temper­
atures. The model of best fit was a linear regression with 
monthly beer consumption as the dependent variable and time
and the average monthly temperature as the independent var-
2 . . . .  lables. The R was 0.632 with valid regression statistics,
and the estimated regression equation describing this rela­
tionship was Y = 23.9 4- 0.21 (T) + 0.51(D), where T is time
(7.8) (3.7) (9.3)
(T is 1 for January of 1971) and D is the average monthly 
temperature in degrees (Fahrenheit)•
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Annual Variation
Since 1961 there has been an annual increase in
the amount of beer Consumed in Montana, with the exception
of 1968 when consumption decreased slightly. Per capita
consumption, both total and adult, has been much more
variable than total consumption because of irregularities
5in the growth of the state's population. Figure 7 il­
lustrates the upsloping trend in beer consumption. It 
appears that beer consumption is increasing at a constant 
rate. This is not entirely consistent with the growth 
rates predicted with the seasonal models above, however.
Nor is it consistent with the proposition that the industry 
is entering the maturity phas,e of the product life cycle —  
characterized by growth at a decreasing rate• These in­
consistencies were dealt with in Chapter V through a 
synthesis of the qualitative and quantitative factors.
In an attempt to estimate an equation describing 
annual beer consumption in Montana, several sets of multi­
ple regressions were estimated., Various combinations of 
the following variables were employed in this analysis: 
annual beer consumption, time, total population, 18 to 34 
age group, wholesale price per case in constant dollars, 
total advertising expenditures (of the top 17 to 24
5See Table 14, page 50 above.
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companies) in constant dollars, the Consumer Price Index, 
the Price Index for Malt Beverages, per capita personal 
income in constant dollars, total per capita beer consump­
tion, and adult per capita beer consumption. Most of these
The advertising expenditures do not include point 
of purchase and any other non-measured media expenditures 
(such as newspapers).
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7models were plagued by multicollmeanty and serial cor­
relation problems. In order to overcome these problems, 
the procedure outlined in Jerome D. Braverman's gProbability, Logic and Management Decisions was followed. 
That is, the redundant independent variables with the low­
est correlation coefficients (with the dependent variable) 
were selectively dropped from the models until the problems 
were overcome.
The best model (that was not hampered by multi- 
collinearity or serial correlation) employed total beer 
consumption as the dependent variable and time and adult
population as the independent variables. This regression
2 . . . .model had an R of 0.962 with significant t-values and a
significant F-ratio at the 95 percent confidence level.
The estimated equation describing this relationship was
Y = -540.1 + 0.70(T) + 2.4(Ap), where T is time and AP is 
(-3.0) (4.0) (5.1)
adult population. Several other models were also quite
good (with significant regression statistics). Four of
these will be mentioned for comparison purposes, as shown
7Multicollmeanty, or lack of independence between 
the independent variables, occurs when there is a high R^ 
and low t-values. It should be noted that multicolline­
arity is not as much of a problem in models designed to 
forecast or predict as it is in models designed to explain 
demand. For forecasting, a model with a high r 2 is needed, 
regardless of the t-values.
8Jerome D. Braverman, Probability, Logic and 
Management Decisions (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
1972), pp. 283-309.
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below.
(1) Y = -814.8 + 2•6(AP) + 0.10(1) 
(-5.3) (4.6) (3.0)
R2 0.950
(2) Y = -485.2 + 14.0(T) + 1.40(P) 
(-1.8) (7.3) (2.5)
R2 0.943
(3) Y = 450.0 + 31.8(T) - 0.70(WP) 
(3.1) (9.1) (-0.02)
R 2 0.931
(4) Y = 507.4 + 33.2(T) - 2.6(YAP) 
(2.4) (5.8) (-0.3)
R 2 0.932
where Y = total beer consumption in Montana 
T = time
AP = adult population
I = per capita personal income in constant dollars 
P = total population
A = total advertising expenditures in constant 
dollars
WP = wholesale price per case in constant dollars 
YAP = 18 to 34 age group 
and T = 1 for 1960.
price per case in constant dollars was low (which indicated 
that the regression coefficient was insignificant). And in 
the fourth model, the t-value for the 18 to 34 age group 
was low. In all combinations in which the wholesale price 
per case or the 18 to 34 age group were among the set of 
independent variables (or when they were the only indepen­
dent variables), the regression statistics were not sig-
2nxfxcant (low R or low t-values or both) . Apparently the
In the third model, the t-value for the wholesale
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history of wholesale prices in constant dollars does not 
significantly affect the level of beer consumption. This 
suggests that the demand for beer is relatively price in­
elastic. A study done by Thomas Hogarty and Kenneth 
Elzinga substantiates this proposition. In their study of
September 1971, entitled, "The Demand for Beer," they ar-
. , 9rived at a price elasticity for beer of -0.9. Thus, total
revenue of the brewers will rise with increases in price 
and decline with decreases in price. In other words, con­
sumers will continue to purchase relatively the same amount 
of beer regardless of price changes (up or down) within 
realistic or tolerable limits, of course. Although it was 
mentioned in previous sections that the 18 to 34 age group 
was thought to be the population segment having the great­
est effect on the aggregate level of beer consumption, this 
analysis does not substantiate it. In fact, when total 
beer consumption was regressed with total population, then
with adult population and then with the 18 to 34 age group, 
?the R s were 0.720, 0.920 and 0.674, respectively, (with 
significant regression statistics). Thus,?the highest 
correlation was with adult population and the lowest cor­
relation was with the 18 to 34 age group.
In order to forecast beer consumption, a model, was
QThomas F. Hogarty and Kenneth G. Elzinga, "The 
Demand for Beer,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 
May 1972, p. 197.
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2needed with a high R and with independent variables whose
values can be predicted with confidence for several years
2into the future. The model with the highest R (the one 
with time and adult population as the independent vari­
ables) was used in generating the forecasts. Since pro­
jections of adult population levels were not available 
for this study, they were estimated through a linear re­
gression (with time as the independent variable). With 
these estimates, the forecasts of total beer consumption 
in Montana through 1985 along with the estimates at the 95 
percent confidence level (the standard error of the esti­
mate was 18.12) are shown in Table 22. The forecasts are 
also plotted on Figure 7.
Summary
In this chapter, the consumption of beer was an­
alyzed on a seasonal and an annual basis• The seasonal 
analysis was approached from a monthly and a quarterly 
respect. By utilizing the method of ratio to moving av­
erage, the seasonal component was isolated and then a 
forecast of consumption for 1976 and 1977 was made with the 
use of an exponential regression model (see Table 20, page 
75). The estimated regression equation describing this 
relationship was Y - 46.2(1•0044)X with an R^ of 0.431.
In analyzing the seasonal variation of the 
quarterly beer consumption data, a linear regression model
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TABLE 22
FORECASTED TOTAL BEER CONSUMPTION, THE PERCENT CHANGE AND 
THE ESTIMATES AT THE 95 PERCENT CONFIDENCE LEVEL FOR 
MONTANA IN THOUSANDS OF BARRELS, 1976-1985
Year Forecast
Percent
change
95 Percent confidence interval'
Low High
1976 671 • • • • 635 707
1977 689 2.7% 653 725
1978 708 2.8 672 744
1979 726 2.5 690 762
1980 744 2.5 708 780
1981 763 2.6 727 799
1982 783 2.6 747 819
1983 799 2.0 763 835
1984 820 2.6 784 856
1985 838 2.2 802 874
*The 95 percent confidence interval is calculated 
based on the standard error of the estimate from the annual 
model only; it does not include the standard error of the 
estimate associated with the regression model used in 
estimating adult population levels.
employing dummy variables was the model of best fit, or
Y = 89.04 + 1.98(X) + 3.73(D2 ) + 52.55(D3) + 47.2l(D4 )
2with an R of 0.933. See Figure 6, page 77 and Table 21,
page 78 for the forecasts for 1976 and 1977.
The correlation between monthly beer consumption
and average monthly temperatures was investigated. The
model of best fit indicated that the correlation between
these two variables was statistically significant, with an 
2R of 0.632 and valid rcgre33ion statistics.
For the annual analysis there were several models
of good fit but the best model used time and adult
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2population as the independent variables with an R of 
0.962, or Y = -540.1 + 0.70(T) + 2.4(AP), where T is 
time and AP is adult population. As a result of the 
annual analysis, it was proposed that the demand for beer 
is relatively price inelastic. And contrary to the ex­
pectations in Chapters II and III, the 18 to 34 age group 
does not seem to have a great effect on the consumption 
of beer in Montana. When the three most important popu­
lation segments (total, adult and 18 to 34) were used as
the independent variables in a model employing beer con-
2sumption as the dependent variable, the lowest R was with
2the 18 to 34 age group (at 0.674) and the highest R was 
with adult population (at 0.920). Furthermore, in all 
models in which the 18 to 34 age group and/or price were 
included in the set of independent variables, their t- 
values were low, which indicated that including these two 
variables in the model would not significantly change the 
results. For the forecasts of beer consumption on an 
annual basis (1976-1985), see Figure 7, page 81 and Table 
22, page 86.
CHAPTER V
EVALUATION AND CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this chapter is to weigh or temper 
the quantitative forecasts of beer consumption made in 
Chapter IV with the qualitative factors affecting the in­
dustry, and the characteristics of the beer market in 
Montana (as discussed in Chapters II and III, respectively). 
In order to facilitate the determination of a revised fore­
cast (on both a seasonal and an annual basis), the qual­
itative forces impinging the industry are summarized below.
Qualitative Factors 
First, it is assumed that the increasing concen­
tration in the brewing industry coupled with changes in 
the marketing practices of the major brewers is signaling 
the entrance of the industry into the maturity phase of the 
product life cycle. Because of this and the expected over­
capacity in the industry, competition is expected to in­
tensify; and advertising expenditures are expected to 
increase rapidly. Intense promotion of beer with modern 
marketing techniques (especially product and market seg­
mentation) should result in increases in the aggregate
level of beer consumption above the expected population
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increases; thus per capita consumption should increase.
This assumption is further validated when analyzed in 
light of the next factor.
Second, it is thought that a great potential exists 
for increasing beer consumption because of the low per 
capita consumption in the United States as compared to 
certain European countries. That is, per capita consump­
tion in the United States is approximately 30 percent and 
46 percent below the levels in the United Kingdom and West 
Germany, respectively.'*' Also, women are consuming more
beer, ". • . 25% of today's beer volume is consumed by
2women, as compared with 15% less than 10 years ago."
More intelligent and aggressive marketing could stimulate 
increases in consumption by women and tend to lessen the 
gap between per capita consumption in the United States and 
Europe.
Third, although the results of this study indicate 
that the growth of the 18 to 34 age group in Montana is not 
as highly correlated with the growth of total in-state beer 
consumption as expected, and is, in fact, not as highly 
correlated as the growth of total population and adult pop­
ulation are to beer consumption, it is generally felt 
within the industry that a slowdown in the growth of this
■^'"Beverages, Basic Analysis," p. B62.
2Ibid., p. B63•
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segment (expected to begin in the early 1980s) will tend 
to slow the trend-line growth of beer consumption.
Fourth, recent estimates of expected increases in 
nationwide consumption have been revised downward from 
earlier estimates. Based on large annual increases in con­
sumption in the early 1970s, it was estimated that the
annual increases from 1974 to 1980 would average 4.5 per-
3 .cent plus or minus 0.5 percent. This growth did material­
ize through 1975, however, Montana experienced a 2.2 per­
cent decrease in aggregate consumption in 1975. In 1976, 
the nationwide growth slowed to 1.2 percent; but growth
4for 1977 is expected to recover to 3 to 4 percent.
Fifth, consumers* tastes, attitudes and preferences 
seem to be changing. For example, -light beers are becoming 
much more popular. At,present, low calorie beers have a 
taste that many find disagreeable. However, they will 
probably become a very important part of the beer market 
(especially among women and older and overweight drinkers) 
when the taste is improved. Attitudes are changing in 
that alcoholic beverages are more socially acceptable; 
there is not.as much of a stigma attached to drinking now . 
as in earlier years. This is manifested in another respect
3 ."Beer Sales Foaming Higher, But Small Breweries
go Dry," Industry Week, 23 October 1972, p. 58.
4"Beverages, Current Analysis," Standard & Poor’s 
Industry Surveys, 10 March 1977, p. B51.
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in that consumers are thought to be including alcohol in
more social occasions than in previous years but consuming
smaller amounts per occasion, thus it is thought that there
5is greater moderation m  drinking.
And sixth, the pending legislation in Montana that 
will, if passed, raise the legal drinking age from eigh­
teen to nineteen could have an effect on aggregate beer con­
sumption. This bill will probably decrease consumption, 
but there were no quantitative estimates of its impact avail­
able. There may be numerous other qualitative factors 
affecting beer consumption; but for the purposes of this 
study, the ones mentioned above were assumed to be the most 
important•
The forecasts of annual beer consumption in Montana 
made in Chapter IV may be assumed to be reasonable accurate 
(see Table 22, page 86). The basis for this assumption 
is that the expected decrease in the size of the 18 to 34 
age group and the possible raising of the legal drinking 
age to nineteen are expected to result in decreased beer 
consumption; but it is likely that this effect will be 
more than offset by increases in consumption due to the ~ 
entrance of the industry into the maturity phase of the 
product life cycle with the accompanying aggressive market-
5 . . . ."A Revolution m  Drinking Reshapes the Liquor
Industry," U.S News and World Report, 21 March 1977, 
pp. 71-73.
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ing techniques (market and product segmentation and differ­
entiation, large increases in advertising outlays, etc.). 
Also, potential exists for increasing consumption through 
increased promotion of products designed for women, over­
weight drinkers, and older drinkers.
The average growth of consumption expected con­
sidering all factors is likely to be about 2.2 percent 
per year for ten years (1976-1985). Consumption is ex­
pected to be quite low through 1977 and then to pick up to 
a quite stable growth of approximately 2.5 percent per year 
from 1978 to 1985. This is consistent with the assumptions 
because the really aggressive marketing by the brewers is 
only in its initial stages at this point in time ; and it 
probably will not be in full force until late 1977 or early 
1978 (when the expected overcapacity will begin to put 
pressures on brewers* margins).
However, the seasonal forecasts, on both a monthly 
and a quarterly basis, are perhaps too high (see Tables 20 
and 21) because they forecast substantial increases in con­
sumption for 1976 and 1977 (7.8 percent and 5.2 percent, 
respectively, for the monthly model and 7.4 percent and 
4.0 percent, respectively for the quarterly model). It is 
unlikely that the growth in consumption will be this high 
when considered in light of the qualitative factors facing 
the industry and the possible changing legal and 
demographic environments in Montana. Therefore, the
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monthly and quarterly forecasts should be lowered by 9,6 
percent and 9,0 percent, respectively, for 1976 and 11.9 
percent and 10c4 percent, respectively, for 1977 to be in 
line with the forecasts made with the annual model.^ Thus, 
the revised forecasts for the monthly model are shown in 
Table 23 and those for the quarterly model are shown in 
Table 24.
TABLE 23
REVISED FORECASTED MONTHLY BEER CONSUMPTION 
FOR MONTANA IN THOUSANDS OF 
BARRELS, 1976-1977
Month 1976 1977
January 40.5 41.7
February 41.5 42.7
March 55.6 57.2
April 62.3 64.1
May 65.8 67.7
June 71.7 73.7
July 67.1 69.0
August 71.4 73.5
September 55.0 56.6
October 48.8 50.1
November 43.9 45.2
December 46.5 47.8
Totals 670.1 689.3
0The percentage adjustment for the 1977 monthly 
data, for example, was determined in this manner:
1977 total from Table 20 - 1977 total from Table 22 _
1977 total from Table 20
11.9 percent.
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TABLE 24
REVISED FORECASTED QUARTERLY BEER CONSUMPTION 
FOR MONTANA IN THOUSANDS OF 
BARRELS, 1976-1977
Quarter 1976 1977
1 142.3 147.2
2 191.9 196.0
3 188.8 193.1
4 147.7 152.5
Totals 670.7 688.8
Conclusions
Probably the single most important factor facing 
the brewing industry is the entrance of the industry into 
the maturity phase of the product life cycle. This factor 
coupled with the other qualitative factors confronting the 
industry (increased concentration, the potential for in­
creased consumption, the slowdown in the growth of the 
18 to 34 age group, changing attitudes toward alcoholic 
beverages, and pending legislation in Montana to raise 
the legal drinking age) have been used in moderating and 
substantiating the forecasts of beer consumption, on both 
a seasonal and an annual basis, made in Chapter IV.
Based on the results of this study, it is likely 
that the aggregate level of beer consumed in Montana will 
continue to increase at the annual rates of growth men­
tioned above barring drastic environmental changes, of 
course, such as stricter legislation concerning drinking
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ages, greatly increased prices, shortages of agricultural 
commodities (due to disease, drought, etc.), a revision of 
consumer attitudes favoring abstinence, and so on. For 
the forseeable future, however, it is unlikely that these 
types of environmental changes will occur; thus, the con­
sumption of beer in Montana should display annual rates of 
growth characteristic of the predictions made above.
SOURCES CONSULTED
Books
Adams, Walter, ed. The Structure of American Industry.
4th ed. New Yorks Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.,
1971.
Axel, Helen, ed. A Guide to Consumer Markets 1975/1976.
New York: The Conference Board, Inc., 1975.
Bain, Joe S. Industrial Organization. 2nd ed. New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1968.
Braverman, Jerome D • Probability, Logic and Management 
Decisions. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
1972.
Brigham, Eugene F.j and Pappas, James L. Managerial
Economics. Hinsdale, Illinois: The Dryden Press, 
Inc., 1972.
Glueck, William F. Business Policy: Strategy Formation and 
Management Action. 2nd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1976.
Koch, James V. Industrial Organization and Prices.
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
1974.
One Hundred Years of Brewing: A Complete History of the
Progress Made in the Art, Science and Industry of 
Brewing in the World, Particularly During the 
Nineteenth Century. Chicago: H. S. Rich and Co., 
1903; reprint ed., New York: Arno Press, 1974.
Pari, Boris. Basic Statistics. Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1967.
Quinn, Larry D. Politicans in Business: A History of the 
Liguor Control System .in Montana. Missoula, 
Montana: University of Montana Press, 1970.
96
97
Rewoldt, Stewart H.; Scott, James D .; and Warshaw, Martin 
R. Introduction to Marketing Management: Text and 
Cases’̂ revised ed. Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. 
Irwin, Inc., 1973.
Samuelson, Paul A. Economics. 10th ed . New York: McGraw- 
Hill Book Company, 1976.
Sinclair, Andrew. Prohibition: The Era of Excess. Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1
Stigler, George J, The Organization of Industry, Homewood, 
Illinois: Richard D 0 Irwin, IncV'i 1968.
Troy, Leo. Almanac of Business and Industrial Financial 
Ratios. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice- 
Ha“117“lnc., 1974-76.
United States Brewer's Association, Inc. The Brewing
Industry in the United States: Brewer's Almanac. 
Washington, t).C." United States Brewer *s 
Association, Inc., 1967-76.
Vogel, Richard H.; Schwaiger, Frank H.; Leonhardt, Henry 
G.; and Merten, J. Adolf. The Practical Brewer: A 
Manual for the Brewing Industry. St. Louis: Von 
Hoffman Press,~1967.
Worcester, Dean A., Jr. Monopoly, Big Business and Welfare 
in the Postwar United States. Seattle: University 
of Washington Press, 1969 0
Ya-Lun Chou. Statistical Analysis: With Business and
Economic Applications. New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, Inc., 1969. ~
Periodicals
"A Revolution in Drinking Reshapes the Liquor Industry.” 
U.S. News and World Report, 21 March 1977, pp. 
71-73.
'•Advertising Costs for Beer, Ale and Malt Liquor.”
Advertising Age, 20 September 1971, pp. 30-32.
"Advertising Costs for Beer, Ale and Malt Liquor."
Advertising Age, 3 November 1975, pp. 28-30.
"Another Setback for Troubled Schlitz." Business Week, 
6 September 1976, pp. 20-21.
98
"Beer Sales Foaming Higher, but Small Breweries go Dry." 
Industry Week, 23 October 1972, pp. 58-61.
Burck, Charles G. "While the Big Brewers Quaff, the Little 
ones Thirst." Fortune, November 1972, pp. 102-7.
"Drinkers Think Cheaper as Cost of Beer Climbs."
Advertising Age, 24 February 1975, p. 3.
Geographical Listings•" The Brewer*s Digest: Buyer*s Guide 
and Directory, section two, January 1976, pp. 
18-36.--------
Greer, Douglas F. "Product Differentiation and
Concentration in the Brewing Industry.” Journal 
of Industrial Economics, July 1971, pp. 201-19.
Hogarty, Thomas F., and Elzinga, Kenneth G. "The Demand
for Beer." The Review of Economics and Statistics, 
May 1972, pp. 195-8.
"Leading Brewers Continue to Widen Sales Lead in 1974." 
Advertising Age, 27 January 1975, p. 26.
"Liquid Consumption Trends in the U.S. From 1964 to 1973." 
Advertising Age, 21 October 1974, p. 70.
"Make Way for Miller.: Forbes, 15 May 1976, p. 45.
National Beer Wholesalers* Association. Beer Wholesalers * 
News and Monthly Bulletin of the National Beer 
Wholesalers * Association of America, Inc.,
February 1970 and February 1976.
"New Threats to the $6 Billion Can Industry." Business 
Week, 22 November 1976, pp. 76-80.
"Olympia Brewing Aims to go National." Business Week,
20 November 1976, pp. 32-33.
"Slowdown in U.S. Growth— How Your State Stands." U.S .
News and World Report, 17 January 1977, p. 55.
Standard & Poor*s Corp. "Liquor, Basic Analysis."
Standard & Poor’s Industry Surveys, 24 July 1975.
Standard & Poor’s Corp. "Liquor, Current Analysis."
Standard & Poor’s Industry Surveys, 24 July 1975.
Standard & Poor’s Corp. "Containers, Basic Analysis."
Standard & Poor's Industry Surveys. 17 June 1976.
99
Standard & Poor's Corp. "Beverages, Basic Analysis."
Standard & Poor's Industry Surveys, 28 October
Standard & Poor's Corp. "Beverages, Current Analysis."
Standard & Poor's Industry Surveys, 2 December
1976.
Standard & Poor's Corp. "Containers, Current Analysis."
Standard & Poor's Industry Surveys, 16 December WTET"------------------------  '
Standard & Poor's Corp. "Beverages, Current Analysis."
Standard & Poor's Industry Surveys, 10 March 1977.
"State Population Projections." U.S. News and World Report, 
12 April 1976, p. 58.
"The Ratios of Manufacturing." Dun's Review, November 1973,
p. 123.
"The Ratios of Manufacturing." 
p. 123.
Dun' s Review, November 1974,
"The Ratios of Manufacturing." 
p . 89.
Dun's Review, December 1975,
"The Ratios of Manufacturing." Dun's Review, December 1976,
p. 91.
"Turmoil Among the Brewers: Miller's Fast Growth Upsets 
the Beer Industry." Business Week, 8 November 
1976, pp. 58-67.
Newspapers
"Economic Squeeze gets too Tight; Great Falls Brewery to 
Close." Great Falls Tribune, 17 July 1968, pp.
1 and 10.
King, Harriet. "West Coast Beer Maker Expanding to
Survive." The New York Times, 30 May 1976, no page.
U.S. Government Publications
U.S. Department of Commerce. National Climatic Center.
Local Climatoloqical Data: Annual Summary With 
Comparative Data, Great Falls, Montana, 1975.
100
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Annual 
Survey of Manufactures, 1974: General Statistics 
for Industry Groups and Industries0
U.S( Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. Annual
Survey of Manufactures, 1966; Concentration Ratios. 
Washington, D.C.; Government Printing Office, 1971.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census 
of Manufactures, 1967. Special Report Series: 
Concentration Ratios in Manufacturing, part 3: 
Employment, Payrolls, Capital Expenditures and 
Other General Statistics. Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1971.
U.S. Department of Commerce. Domestic and International 
Business Administration. Bureau of Domestic 
Commerce. 1976 U.S. Industrial Outlook With 
Projections to 1985. Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1976.
U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census.
Statistical Abstract of the United States. 
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1962-75.
Interviews
Andrews, Elton M., retired. U.S. Brewer's Association,
Inc., Helena, Montana. Interview, 3 January 1977.
Bruskotter, Robert, Jr. Manager, Buttrey Food Stores, 
Holiday Village Branch, Great Falls, Montana. 
Interview, 21 January 1977.
Dalich, Anthony. Historian, Great Falls, Montana. 
Interview, 28 January 1977.
Mulhol-land, -Tom.- Liquor Division-of the Department of 
Revenue, Helena, Montana. Interview, 3 January
1977.
Rembe, Karl. Manager, Pennington's, Inc., Great Falls, 
Montana. Interview, 4 January 1977.
Watkins, Bruce. Manager, Gusto Distributing Company,
Great Falls, Montana. Interview, 25 January 1977.
